

EUROPEAN UNION SECTOR SPECIFIC GENDER ANALYSIS:

AN IN-DEPTH SECTORAL EXAMINATION
OF FEMINIST AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS
ISSUES IN LEBANON

LEBANON

July 2021



Funded by the European Union



United Nations Entity for Gender Equality
and the Empowerment of Women


*This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union.
Its contents are the sole responsibility of UN Women Lebanon and do not
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to extend a special thanks to Roula Abbas at the EU delegation in Lebanon for commissioning and overseeing this work, as well as the technical team at UN Women who led on the research and knowledge production: Research Coordinator: Claire Wilson; Lead Analyst and Writer: Carly Fuglei; Technical Advisor: Lara Saade; Coordination Specialist: Olivia Schmitz; and the Head of Office: Rachel Dore-Weeks. Many thanks to the Triangle

Lebanon team, including, Sami Halabi, Yasmine Minkara, Gulnar Wakim, and Ahmed Al Mustaka, for supporting the data collection and conducting the SSGA survey. We extend a heartfelt thanks to all of the women, men and gender non-conforming individuals who contributed their time, insights and expertise to produce this report, and hope its content can contribute to advancing gender equality and women's rights in Lebanon.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

The European Union (EU) Delegation to Lebanon partnered with UN Women to develop a sector-specific gender analysis (SSGA). This analysis provides evidence on which the EU, EU Member States, and other stakeholders may base strategic priorities for action in support of gender equality over the next seven years in Lebanon, in line with the EU's global Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) framework. It builds on the findings of the 2021 Lebanon Gender Assessment developed by the World Bank, UN Women, and the National Commission for Lebanese Women. This complementary gender analysis aims to provide in-depth analysis of the following sectors from the GAP III framework: I) freedom from all forms of gender-based violence (GBV); II) economic and social rights and the empowerment of women; and III) women's leadership and participation in politics and public life. Specific attention is given to intersectional analysis, examining the experiences of women and gender minorities in Lebanon based on differences

in age, socio-economic background, ability, nationality, legal status, sexual orientation, and gender identity and expression.

The revision of the EU's Gender Action Plan in Lebanon comes at a time of multiple overlapping crises – economic, political, public health, and the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion - that disproportionately impact women and girls. The growing insecurity in Lebanon because of the ongoing crises presents an acute threat to the pursuit of a more gender equal society. Nevertheless, potential opportunities for improvement remain.

METHODS

The SSGA relied on a mixed-method approach, including an extensive literature review of 120 documents related to gender equality and women's rights issues (largely from 2018 onward) as well as qualitative and quantitative data collection, consulting with 108 diverse gender equality advocates and stakeholders, and surveying 1,230 women from Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the South, the North, and the Bekaa.

FINDINGS

SECTOR I: FREEDOM FROM ALL FORMS OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

There is no nationally representative data on the prevalence of gender-based violence in Lebanon, but numerous studies have shown that GBV is common, particularly domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Some estimates suggest rates of domestic violence are as high as one in three for married women (UN Women 2017), and an estimated one out of every two people knows someone who has been subjected

to domestic violence (UNFPA 2017). GBV appears to be on the rise alongside the economic crisis, linked to negative food insecurity coping strategies and increasing levels of debt. Combating GBV in Lebanon necessitates tackling three main issues: a) persisting legal inequality, b) patriarchal social and cultural norms and c) insufficient service provision, including challenges in the justice sector.

¹ All citations in the executive summary are included in the body of the full report, with the full reference list at the end of the report.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

Lebanon's 15 Personal Status Laws (PSLs) codify gender inequalities, institutionalizing women's status as secondary to men across a range of matters, including divorce, marriage, custody, land ownership, etc. The laws make women and girls more vulnerable to violence, and many even explicitly allow for gender-based violence (GBV). Although domestic violence, sexual harassment, honour crimes, and rape (outside of marriage) have become criminalized over the past decade, many of the laws criminalizing those actions are restrictive in their definitions, and certain provisions of criminal law still enable a host of legalized discrimination based on gender. The 2014 law on domestic violence only covers violence within the family, while Article 534 of the Penal Code criminalizes "unnatural" sex, and Articles 503 and 504 fail to criminalize marital rape. Recent legal achievements include the 2020 sexual harassment law and amendments to the 2014 domestic violence law, as well as raising the minimum age for marriage to 18 for Sunni girls under the Sunni courts.

PATRIARCHAL SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NORMS

Research has shown that gendered power relations are at the root of gender-based violence. Although recent studies indicate that the majority of the Lebanese population believe it is never justifiable for a man to beat his wife, at least one in five men approve of violence against women, agreeing with the statement, "there are times when a woman deserves to be beaten." There is evidence that there is increasing acceptance of violence against women amongst young men.

Racist, homophobic, and ableist norms and attitudes are also factors in GBV prevalence and in the lack of recourse for victims of GBV. Informed by patriarchal and racist attitudes,

violence against migrant domestic workers is well documented and highly prevalent. These women are viewed as second class citizens, and their exploitation is normalized. Lebanese society is still largely homophobic, and homosexuality is criminalized, making it effectively impossible for LGBTIQ+ individuals to report GBV against them, even though they face high rates of discrimination and violence. This is a fundamentally gendered and feminist issue: these communities are being targeted for transgressing patriarchal norms around sexuality and gender. How they define and actualize gender is seen as a threat precisely because they break away from accepted social norms. Special attention is needed to address the gender discrimination specific to lesbian, bisexual, queer, and trans (LBTQ) women and gender non-conforming individuals due to patriarchal structures.

UNDER-RESOURCED AND LIMITED-SERVICE PROVISION

The lack of state and institutional capacity to effectively respond to GBV leaves service provision to a patchwork of NGOs. To fill gaps left by the state, NGOs developed a response system to GBV. However, it is challenging for even the most effective and coordinated GBV response mechanisms provided by NGOs to ultimately replace well-coordinated state-based mechanisms. Lebanon's absence of clear response frameworks (e.g., a national referral mechanism or inter-ministerial structures) combined with weak institutions means that survivors often are unable to seek adequate services and justice. The administration of justice is fraught with discriminatory policies and practices, namely a lack of effective prosecution of perpetrators and patriarchal approaches to addressing cases of GBV. In addition, male family members and community members play a strong intervening role in whether and how any form of justice is sought.

SECTOR II: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Lebanon has made progress in expanding protections for working women, yet significant challenges remain in the labour law. The law specifically prohibits women from working in certain sectors. Labour Law 207 stipulates that employers must not discriminate based on gender, yet this provision does not include LGBTIQ+ persons. No equal pay for equal work legislation exists. Social Security Laws explicitly discriminate against women, as men receive automatic monetary benefits (or allowances) for their children while women are entitled to such benefits only if their husband is dead or disabled. Personal Status Laws impact women's economic positioning due to unequal inheritance laws and practices, which mean that women have less access to capital and are less likely to own land.

After years of lobbying by feminist groups, the Lebanese Parliament passed a sexual harassment law in 2020. However, the law is independent from both the labour law and the penal code, lacks any clear mechanism for implementation, and does not include migrants, refugees, or LGBTIQ+ people. Palestinian, Syrian, and other refugee populations and stateless people living in Lebanon are all effectively excluded from the Lebanese labour law and need to apply for residency and work permits. Migrant domestic workers are also excluded from the labour law, and they are subjected to a system of sponsorship (the Kafala system) that limits their access to social protection and increases their risk of exploitation.

Policies, practices, codes of conduct (or lack thereof), and gendered norms in the business environment impact both women's ability to work and feelings of safety and security in the workplace. Of the 623 SSGA survey respondents who had worked in the past or

were currently working, 25% reported having experienced verbal harassment and 17% said they had been sexually harassed at work. Discrimination is even higher against women from minority backgrounds, and, while very few public places are accessible to those with disabilities, even fewer businesses are suitable workplaces for disabled women.

Women own a very small percentage of businesses in Lebanon (estimated at 10%) (World Bank, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and European Investment Bank 2019), which affects their economic status. Discriminatory recruitment and employment practices persist, with many employers continuing to report a preference for hiring men due to their beliefs around women's roles in the home.

FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION

At the end of 2019, the female labour force participation rate in Lebanon was very low, at 29.3% overall as compared to men's labour force participation rate of 70.4%. The labour market also suffers from gender segregation, whereby women are disproportionately active in specific sectors, such as banking, health, education, and the public sector, which are not growing currently. Across different regions and nationalities, participation of women in the labour market is considerably lower. Participation of women is particularly low in the northern and southern governorates and amongst refugees. There are no statistics on LGBTIQ+ individuals in Lebanon, meaning there is no information on the extent to which they participate in the workforce. Despite legislation advancing their access to employment, only 5.5% of women with disabilities participate in the workforce.

A large number of SSGA survey respondents had participated in skills training and/or cash for work programmes, and they had positive things to say about these programmes. Those currently employed felt that economic empowerment programmes had helped them find jobs and that this programming provides economic support to women in their regions. However, nearly half of the respondents who participated in either type of programme were not currently employed. Women who are or were participants in skills training programmes said they attended training sessions mainly to leave their homes, create social networks, and learn skills, but not necessarily to find jobs. Respondents who were working were largely interested in further training to improve their current work, but Syrian women felt that improving service provision would be equally important for improving their ability to work.

Areas of potential growth over the next seven years have preliminarily been identified by the EU² as the knowledge economy, tourism, agriculture, and industrial production of consumer-facing products.³ Targeted and clear plans to engage women in each sector are necessary to encourage equal representation of men and women in these types of work.

NORMS, FAMILY LIFE, AND UNPAID CARE WORK

More than one quarter (31%) of SSGA survey respondents had never even considered engaging in paid work, mostly due to childcare responsibilities, not having the right skillset, and their spouses not allowing it. It is well-documented that social norms continue to prevent women from entering the paid labour force. Prevailing data show that gender norms related to women and work persist, as does the lack of support from male partners when it comes to childcare and household tasks. Statistically speaking, marriage and children

are highly significant determinants of a woman's likelihood to work, as being married reduces the likelihood of joining the labour force for women.

Formal childcare services, such as community-based childcare centres, Social Development centres (SDCs), and private day cares are limited and often too expensive, so they are rarely used. Only 11% of SSGA respondents had taken their children to a community-based centre, SDC, or private childcare centre. Findings also suggested that Syrian women have even less access to childcare and depend on their family networks even more heavily than Lebanese women.

SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS

There are concerns that access to sexual and reproductive health and rights, an area with a well-established linkage to women's economic participation, is deteriorating due to the economic crisis.

Women in Lebanon are particularly affected by the lack of access to high-quality family planning and reproductive health services. This puts women at risk for unwanted pregnancy and unsafe deliveries. This health risk is especially borne by non-Lebanese women, as their maternal mortality rate is 29 births in 1000, quadruple that of Lebanese women. The economic crisis is threatening women and girls' access to basic hygiene materials, as the cost of sanitary products (both imported and locally produced) has been increasing at an alarming rate, with an overall increase of around 320% since October 2019. LBTQ women, particularly those in rural areas, also suffer from limited access to healthcare, as the only centres sensitized to their needs are in Beirut. Women migrant domestic workers are excluded from the Lebanese labour law's maternity protections and benefits. Under Kafala, their sexual, reproductive, and maternal rights are not protected.

² This is based on the EU economic assistance strategy that is being developed in tandem with this writing.

³ For example, textiles, fashion and furniture making and design, recycling, and woodwork.

SECTOR III: WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE, INCLUDING MATTERS OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Considering the systematic exclusion and persistent low representation of women across elected offices and leadership positions, enhancing women's political participation has been a long-time priority for feminist actors in Lebanon. Along with more traditional political and leadership spaces, women have been systematically excluded from peace-making and political dialogues in Lebanon, and they are grossly underrepresented in Lebanon's security forces – a key body for maintaining peace, security, and social cohesion in the country.

WOMEN IN ELECTED AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

The representation of Lebanese women in the political arena has increased some in recent years, yet remains very low. As of June 2021, women represent 30% of ministerial posts, with the first ever Lebanese and Arab women Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense appointed to office. As noted in numerous studies, the 2018 parliamentary elections saw a significant change in the number of women registering (113 – up from 12 in 2009) and running for office (86), the vast majority of whom ran for seats in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Despite the increase in the number of women running, very few won elected seats. Women make up only 4.7% of representatives in the National Parliament (six women out of 128 parliamentarians) and 6% of municipal councillors.

A gender analysis of six syndicate/union bodies in 2018 found that while women were represented in some of the bodies, very few women served in leadership positions. For example, 38% of members in the Beirut Bar Association were women, but they occupied only 17% of leadership positions in committees. In more feminized professions, such as nursing and education and social work, women are better represented, and recent elections – including for the Order

of Engineers and Architects and university student leadership positions – have witnessed an increase in women's leadership and engagement. Although the right to self-organize in the form of a migrant domestic workers' union has been politically fraught in Lebanon, women migrant workers under the National Federation formed a union under the Employees' and Workers' Unions in Lebanon (FENASOL).

Women are prevented from attaining leadership roles in the political sphere and the public sphere for a number of reasons, including prohibitive costs, insufficient and often sexist media coverage, and legal barriers. Despite being a country of confessional quotas, Lebanon does not have gender quotas for any elected body. Yet according to those surveyed in the 2017 IMAGES survey, 81% of Lebanese men and 91% of Lebanese women supported a fixed proportion of places or quotas for women in the Parliament and the Cabinet. In addition, specific facets of the electoral laws, including preferential voting, districting and financing policies, as well as persistent legal inequalities, create disadvantages for women. Discrimination is also present in political parties, where male competitors are preferred for candidacies above equally or more qualified women. Social norms that characterize women as belonging in the private sphere and not possessing leadership qualities inhibit women's attainment of leadership positions, as does their absence from the workplace and business – a consistent pipeline in Lebanon into elected offices and leadership positions.

WOMEN IN UNIONS

A gender analysis of six syndicate/union bodies in 2018 found that while women were represented in some of the bodies, there were very few women serving in leadership

positions (Hivos 2021). For example, 38% of members in the Beirut Bar Association were women, but women only occupied 17% of leadership positions in committees. Other syndicates had low representation of women, likely reflecting their lack of participation in these professions.

WOMEN IN PEACE AND SECURITY

There are no comprehensive statistics available on how many women serve as part of the approximately 128,000 active security personnel in Lebanon, but the overall percentage is thought to be low. Women make up 3.6% of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and 4.7% of the General Security personnel. In 2019, women made up 5% of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In 2019, for the first time in Lebanon's history, two female combat pilots joined the Lebanese Air Force.

The protests in Lebanon in 2019 galvanized a new set of political actors, including large numbers of women and female-led organisations, many of which claim to be outside of the established political elite

with reformist platforms. The protests also normalized calls for greater diversity in Lebanon's political arena, seeking political diversity and gender diversity while creating new spaces for greater cross-sectarian dialogue on Lebanon's history and future.

Women were at the forefront of these protests, building new political alliances, calling for reform, and working to de-escalate tensions – both through using their bodies to prevent physical violence and in leading cross-sectarian peace actions such as marches and small-scale negotiations during periods of escalation or violence. Those women continue to lead efforts to create alternatives to Lebanon's current political system and to call for reconciliation and a process to deal with Lebanon's violent past, building on a long history of women's peace activism in Lebanon. This activism occurs despite women's systematic exclusion from every peace dialogue and negotiation in and about Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Investment in women's rights and gender equality is an investment in socio-economic recovery in Lebanon. Targeted actions proposed in this report reflect the specific demands, needs, and priorities of women across the country, and are based on the current situation at the time of this writing.

FREEDOM FROM ALL FORMS OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

A holistic approach is needed to prevent and respond to gender-based violence and violence against women in Lebanon. Efforts must support key legislative reforms that mandate women's equality and provide protection from harassment and violence. These reforms include adopting a unified civil personal status law, mandating a minimum

age of marriage, criminalizing marital rape, expanding the scope of the 2014 Domestic Violence Law to include intimate partner violence and other family violence law amendments, repealing Article 534 of the penal code which is used to criminalize same-sex relations and certain gender identities and expressions, and granting women equal rights to citizenship.

GBV programming should specifically target and mainstream interventions which tackle patriarchal socio-cultural norms and toxic masculinity whilst addressing intersecting racist, homophobic, and ableist attitudes. GBV programming should be scaled-up and better connected with economic empowerment programming. To meet the needs of the most vulnerable, GBV service providers must be

supported to allow them to better reach rural and underserved areas, including Akkar, the South, and Bekaa, as well as to increase their technical capacities to meet the needs of GBV survivors with marginalized identities, including women and girls with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ individuals, and women migrant domestic workers. In the long term, governmental institutions and services must be strengthened to respond to GBV as well as sexual exploitation and abuse experienced while accessing services, including abuses by government personnel and aid workers.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

Lobbying for urgent macroeconomic policies to address Lebanon's currency fluctuations, national debt, and capital mobility is not enough to respond to the depth of the crisis. Work that seeks to ensure that women are not disproportionately impacted by the crisis must be integrated into all policy reform measures and all support packages to Lebanon. In the long-term, efforts must focus on restructuring the economy and the state so that they are based on economic equality and social justice, including efforts to establish social and labour protections that are gender responsive.

In the short-term, targeted approaches must be developed to ensure that women are equally included and reached in all economic assistance interventions across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus; economic assistance must be channelled with the goal of maintaining and increasing jobs for women to decrease the gender labour force participation gap. These interventions must address the root causes of women's exclusion from the economy, such as gendered social norms which dictate that women should remain in the home or in specific sectors of the economy, unpaid care burdens, women's challenges in accessing capital and establishing businesses, and discriminatory labour and social security legislation and

policies – at the national level, in the public sector, and in the private sector.

As period poverty rises and maternal mortality rates rise, support must be given to ensure women and girls access their sexual and reproductive health and rights. In the short term, this can be done through humanitarian service and distribution channels, long-term this entails supporting Lebanon's health infrastructure and productive sectors to meet these challenges.

WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE, INCLUDING MATTERS OF PEACE AND SECURITY

The implementation of Lebanon's National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is a central roadmap for increasing the participation of women in decision-making processes at all levels, including the political, diplomatic, and economic sectors and also in the security and defense sectors, and for enhancing all efforts to prevent and contain armed conflicts. Specifically, efforts must be supported to lobby for the revision of the 2017 Electoral Law, to legally mandate a 50% female quota in parliament and reduce candidacy registration fees, which would address inequalities in campaign financing. Women must also be supported to lead on all matters of peace, security, and recovery in Lebanon, including any forthcoming technical or political dialogues. At the community level, women must be supported to prevent and address conflicts and to lead work on issues of accountability, reconciliation, and dialogue.

It remains critical that women have equal representation in decision making bodies within coordination structures across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, including all institutional levels of the Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction (3RF) Framework, the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), and all forthcoming Emergency Appeals.

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ACRONYMS

CAS	Central Administration for Statistics
CLIP	Country-Level Implementation Plan
EU	European Union
FLFP	Female Labour Force Participation
GAP III	Gender Action Plan III
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee
ISF	Internal Security Forces
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LGBTIQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer Plus
LBQT	Lesbian, Bisexual, Queer and Transgender
LFHLCs	Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey
MENA	Middle East-North Africa
MGF	Mashreq Gender Facility
MOSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NCLW	National Commission for Lebanese Women
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PRLs	Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSLs	Personal Status Laws
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SHRH	Sexual Health and Reproductive Rights
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable and Action-Oriented, Relevant, and Time-Bound
SSGA	Sector-Specific Gender Analysis
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

INTRODUCTION



The European Union (EU) Delegation to Lebanon partnered with UN Women to develop a sector-specific gender analysis (SSGA). Building on the findings of the 2021 Lebanon Gender Assessment, developed by the World Bank, UN Women, and the National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) (World Bank forthcoming) and in line with the EU's global Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) framework (European Commission), this analysis provides evidence on which stakeholders in Lebanon may base their strategic priorities for investment in and action to support of gender equality and women's rights. This analysis was conducted between April and June 2021.

OVERVIEW OF GAP III

The EU periodically re-evaluates and revises its strategy for promoting gender equality across the world. Developed in 2020, GAP III is the third such strategy. GAP III provides the EU with a policy framework for accelerating progress towards meeting international commitments on gender equality and advances a world in which everyone has space to thrive. It makes the promotion of gender equality a priority of all external policies and actions, offers a roadmap for working together with stakeholders at national, regional, and multilateral levels, steps up action in strategic thematic areas, calls for institutions to lead by example, and ensures transparency of the results. As such, the six thematic issues of focus for the GAP III policy agenda are shown in Table 1

RATIONALE FOR THE EU GENDER ACTION PLAN IN LEBANON

The EU is dedicated to promoting a gender-equal world, both in terms of its domestic policies and

its international partnerships. The revision of the EU's Gender Action Plan in Lebanon comes at a time of multiple overlapping crises – economic, political, public health, and the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion. At the time of writing this analysis, Lebanon continues to be managed by a caretaker government after the August 2020 resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab's government. Government formation remains at a standstill, despite the country's unrelenting financial and economic meltdown. The World Bank has described Lebanon's economic and financial crisis as a 'deliberate depression' and 'likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top three, most severe crisis episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century' (World Bank 2021c). Food inflation continues to rise alongside currency inflation, with the cost of the revised food survival minimum expenditure basket having increased by 320% from October 2019 to present day (International Rescue Committee 2021). Moreover, concerns around shortages of fuel and electricity remain.

TABLE 1. GAP III PRIORITY SECTORS

1	Freedom from all forms of gender-based violence against women, girls, men, and boys
2	Universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights
3	Economic and social rights, and the empowerment of girls and women
4	Women's participation and leadership in politics and public life
5	Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda
6	Including women and girls in the green transition and digital transformation

This deep and complex crisis poses historical threats to gains made on women's rights and gender equality, with data suggesting women are being disproportionately impacted by its effects due to generations of structural gender discrimination and inequality.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC GENDER ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES

The EU endeavours to contextualize the GAP III Framework for the current context in Lebanon. The intended outcome of this exercise is to ensure the EU's gender strategy for Lebanon

aligns with the priorities outlined in the GAP III and with the specific context, needs, and priorities of diverse groups of women in Lebanon. Box 1 provides a detailed background for the SSGA. The specific objectives are:

1. To provide a contextual analysis of gender equality issues in Lebanon using EU GAP III thematic areas.
2. To produce practical and actionable recommendations on key priority areas for Lebanon with a seven-year projection (2021-2027).

2. METHODOLOGY⁴

METHODS

The SSGA relied on a mixed-method approach, including an extensive literature review as well as qualitative and quantitative data collection.

Literature Review (N=120): The literature review built on the findings of and identified gender knowledge gaps from the 2021


Lebanon Gender Assessment written by UN Women, the World Bank, and the National Commission for Lebanese Women (World Bank forthcoming). In addition, 120 reports, assessments, studies, and other related documents were reviewed focusing primarily on literature published after 2018 by think tanks, academia, UN agencies, civil society,

⁴ This section provides an abridged summary of the method for the SSGA. The full methodology is available in Annex 1.

BOX 1. THE 2021 LEBANON GENDER ASSESSMENT AND THE SSGA

The SSGA builds on the findings the 2021 Lebanon Gender Assessment completed by the World Bank, NCLW, and UN Women between January and June of 2021. The Profile is a comprehensive analysis of the legal status of women, the institutional framework for gender equality, the role of civil society, livelihoods and women's economic opportunities, health, education, participation, and decision making, and gender roles in Lebanon. It relied on an extensive desk review and original statistical analysis of a variety of databases. Analysis drew heavily on the 2018-2019 Labor Force and Household Living Conditions Survey (LFHLCS) in addition to the 2011 Household Budget Survey, the World Values Survey (WAVE 7 – 2018), UN Women-Promundo IMAGES survey Lebanon dataset (2017), and the Arab Barometer (2018- 2019). UN Women used the findings of the Profile as the methodological basis for the SSGA, structuring the consultation process around key findings in each area of focus. The SSGA sought to delve deeper into the Profile's findings by adding qualitative depth to the statistics-heavy Profile and by strengthening the intersectional lens on such analysis.

Figure 1.
SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY



and the government of Lebanon on the GAP III sectors as well as on statistical analysis of relevant and available datasets.

Consultations (N=109): Using its existing networks as a starting point, UN Women mapped key feminist, gender equality, and women's rights stakeholders in all regions of Lebanon to include them in key informant interviews and/or roundtable discussions. The majority of these stakeholders were: 1) leaders of local grassroots organizations that provide direct services to women 2) local analysts who provide commentary and/or input on policy development or 3) think tanks/universities/feminist activists and community organizers across each thematic

area, including new emerging youth groups. Key informant interviews were mainly with policy and academic-level individuals with significant experience working in different areas in support of gender equality. A total of 38 people participated in 31 key informant interviews (one man, one gender non-conforming individual, and 36 women) and 71 people participated in nine roundtables (five men, 65 women, and one gender minority). Four of the roundtables were held with stakeholders from different regions of the country: Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, Northern Lebanon, and South Lebanon. One roundtable was held with stakeholders from an emerging feminist civil society platform,⁵ one with

⁵ A group of Lebanon-based feminist activists and women's rights organizations that formed as a response to the Beirut Blast (UN Women 2020b).

emerging youth activists, one with UN gender actors, and two with EU Member-States. All consultations except four KIIs occurred remotely due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Survey (N=1,230): A survey aimed to contextualize preliminary consultation findings, investigate new vulnerability profiles in Lebanon, and interrogate how best to approach women's economic and political empowerment as concepts. The survey looked at how women of different backgrounds (and sectors of work)


viewed economic and political empowerment in the current context. It also built-in assessments of four key sectors identified by the EU as potential focus areas for its economic assistance programme: agriculture, industry, the knowledge economy, and tourism. A total of 1,223 women (55% Lebanese and 45% Syrian), and seven persons who did not disclose their gender, across four regions of the country participated in the SSGA survey. See Annex 2 for further details.

GAP III SECTOR ANALYSIS FOR LEBANON

Given the deteriorating political and economic situation in Lebanon that is only likely to worsen in the near future, there is broad consensus amongst feminist and women's rights actors that the following three sectors from the EU's Gender Action Plan (GAP) should be prioritized for support and interventions across the humanitarian, development, and peace and security nexus:

1. freedom from all forms of gender-based violence against women, girls, men, and boys,
2. promoting economic and social rights and the empowerment of girls and women, and
3. enhancing women's participation and leadership in politics and public life in Lebanon.



Figure 2.**Top 5 Feminist Civil Society Platform Priorities**

Source: Feminist Charter Members, March 2021

This prioritization was also informed by the results of the Lebanon Gender Assessment developed by the World Bank, UN Women, and the NCLW in 2021.

Further evidence in support of this prioritization comes from the demands of the Lebanon feminist civil society platform (figure 2). A March 2021 survey with 36 of the original 42 feminist charter signatories echoed these three GAP III sectors as the most pressing needs in response to the crises, as seen in the table below (Saade 2021).

As highlighted during the consultations undertaken to inform this assessment, all of the GAP III sectors intersect with one another in important ways. For example, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, outlined by the United Nations Security Council across 10 resolutions,⁶ provides a framework that cuts across the three priority areas in its approach to addressing conflict and

insecurity and is currently being implemented, in part, through the Lebanon National Action Plan (NAP) on Resolution 1325 in 2019.⁷ Given the significant overlap between the GAP III priorities and Lebanon's NAP on 1325, synergies between the two frameworks are highlighted throughout the report.

GAP priority sector 1, universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights, also features as a sub-theme within the selected GAP III priority sector four, promoting economic and social rights and the empowerment of girls and women, given the link between women's sexual health and reproductive rights and their ability to access their economic and social rights. GAP priority sector 6, including women and girls in the green transition and digital transformation, equally features as a sub-theme within priority sector four given the importance of green economies and the digital sector for Lebanon's growth and recovery.

⁶ UN Security Council: S/RES/1325 (2000), S/RES/1820 (2008), S/RES/1888 (2008), S/RES/1889 (2009), S/RES/1960 (2010), S/RES/2106 (2013), S/RES/2122 (2013), S/RES/2242 (2015), S/RES/2467 (2019), and S/RES/2493 (2019).

⁷ This action plan was developed by the Government of Lebanon, with the National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) serving as the convener and secretariat, supported by the United Nations, which was led by UN Women.

FINDINGS: SECTOR I
FREEDOM FROM ALL
FORMS OF GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE



GBV is defined by UN Women as: “harmful acts directed at an individual or a group of individuals based on their gender. It is rooted in gender inequality, the abuse of power, and harmful norms. The term is primarily used to underscore the fact that structural, gender-based, power differentials place women and girls at risk for multiple forms of violence” (UN Women n.d.). There is no nationally representative prevalence data on gender-based violence in Lebanon, but numerous studies have shown that GBV is common, particularly domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Some estimates suggest rates of domestic violence are as high as one in three married women (UN Women 2017), and an estimated one in every two people know someone who has been subjected to domestic violence (UNFPA 2017). Informal tented settlements and camps where disproportionate numbers of Syrian refugee reside have some of the highest reported levels of violence against women (UN Women 2021c).

Recent data suggests that 65% of Palestinians live in poverty, and that Palestinian women experience high rates of GBV, likely closely associated with economic vulnerability (Chaaban et al. 2016; UNRWA 2015).

In line with global and regional trends, data limitations are linked in part to the fact that the vast majority of GBV cases in Lebanon go unreported due to stigma, family pressures, fear of reprisal, and lack of trust in services (Ibid). In addition to cases of physical and verbal violence against women, cyber harassment, economic violence, forced sex work, and sex trafficking are other forms of GBV that are reported in Lebanon (Jabbour 2020; UN Women 2021b).

GBV appears to be on the rise alongside the economic crisis, and similar to the rest of the world, Lebanon saw a dramatic spike in GBV during the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020-2021. Data from a hotline run by the Internal Security Forces (ISF) show calls from women victims of violence seeking help from the police almost doubled between 2019 and 2020, from 846 calls in December 2019 to 1487 calls in December 2020. The majority of women seeking urgent support were between the ages of 21 and 50, and the violence against them was committed primarily by their husband (60%), followed by their father or brother (22%) (UNDP and CAS forthcoming). These numbers and trends are mimicked across the hotlines of NGO service providers (UN Women, National Commission for Lebanese Women, World Health Organization Lebanon, & UNFPA 2020e).

SUB-TOPIC 1: GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

Personal Status Laws and Nationality Rights: The Legal Underpinnings of Violence Against Women

Confessional PSLs in Lebanon are a significant contributor to the legal foundations of gender inequality in Lebanon. They make women and girls more vulnerable to violence, institutionalize their status as secondary to men, and many even explicitly allow for gender-based violence through

protecting practices such as marital rape and child marriage. There are 15 PSLs laws in Lebanon that regulate issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody. The religious sect one is born into determines which law applies. Therefore, in addition to entrenching gender inequality, PSLs also serve as an essential pillar of Lebanon’s sectarian political system, tying people to their confessions through regulating the regulation of personal matters.⁸

⁸ Since 1990, sectarian political elites and their respective parties have entered power-sharing arrangements that distribute the State’s institutions and resources along sectarian lines, including Lebanon’s legal system.

Confessional PSLs limit women's rights to equal inheritance and, in some cases, their right to custody of their children and to divorce their husbands (Salameh 2015). As marriage is also under the jurisdiction of religious courts, there is no national law prohibiting early marriage for girls. As of May 2021, the Sunni courts became the first to pass an amendment making marriage before the age of 16 illegal, but this only applies for one out of fifteen sects in Lebanon (Lazkani, 2021). PSLs reinforce patriarchal social norms by concentrating power over intimate decisions in the hands of male members of families and by cementing women's subordination to men, making the establishment of secular and unified PSLs a longstanding objective of feminist and women's rights actors.

In addition, Lebanon's legal framework around issues of nationality prohibits women from passing their nationality to spouses and/or children. This prohibition fuels the notion that women are secondary to men and contributes to statelessness in Lebanon, which can prohibit those born in Lebanon who lack Lebanese nationality from reporting

or addressing GBV. This specifically impacts those of mixed Lebanese and Palestinian or Syrian backgrounds who are often from impoverished and more conservative communities and who report very high rates of GBV (UN Women 2021c).

Gender Discrimination in Criminal Law

Gender discrimination is rife within Lebanon's criminal law. The following analysis summarizes leading components of this discrimination. Although domestic violence, sexual harassment, honour crimes, and rape (outside of marriage) have become criminalized over the past decade, certain provisions of Lebanon's criminal law still enable a host of legalized forms of discrimination based on gender. The 2014 law on domestic violence (No. 293, Law on the Protection of Women and Family Members Against Domestic Violence) lacks a unified definition and interpretation of domestic violence before civil courts and does not cover all forms of GBV, since it only applies in cases of domestic violence between family members (Expertise France 2021). Moreover,



Lebanese laws do not define sexual violence. The only direct reference to it is contained in Law No. 293, and its scope is limited to the family (Republic of Lebanon 2014). The Penal Code does not specify “crimes of sexual violence,” but instead deals with a number of crimes that fall within the broader definition. For example, rape outside of marriage is a criminal offence with a minimum punishment of imprisonment for five years, yet the definition of rape explicitly excludes forced sex in marriage (Articles 503, 504). In addition, Article 534 of the Penal Code criminalizes “unnatural” sex with a punishment of one year in prison and has been used to prosecute homosexual conduct.

Other Laws Underpinning GBV

The Kafala system is a clear contributor to GBV against migrant domestic workers. This system ties a worker’s residency status to a specific employer, which creates conditions that lead to GBV and provides migrant domestic workers with little chance of recourse. Domestic workers are also not covered by the domestic violence law (UN Women 2021b). Migrant domestic workers, 99% of whom are women, regularly suffer sexual abuse and labour exploitation

under the Kafala system, and there is often impunity for the perpetrators. Documented violations include slavery, human trafficking, physical and sexual violence, exploitation, and widespread labour violations, including forced labour amongst many others (Amnesty International 2019).

Successful Legislative Reforms 2010-2021

Significant legal achievements in the past decade have included: repealing Article 562 of the Penal Code that allowed for reduction of sentences for honour crimes (2011), the passage of the 2014 law criminalizing domestic violence, the 2017 repeal of Article 522 of the Penal Code which allowed for exoneration of a rapist who married his victim, the 2020 passage of a law criminalizing sexual harassment in the workplace, and amendments passed in 2020 to the 2014 domestic violence law. As previously mentioned, the approval of a 2021 resolution, number 62, by the Supreme Islamic Sharia Council raised the minimum age for marriage to 18 for Sunni girls, making Sunnis the first sect to do so (Lazkani 2021).

SUB-TOPIC 2: PATRIARCHAL SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NORMS

Root Cause of GBV: Gendered Power Relations

For decades, research has shown that gendered power relations are at the root of gender-based violence. Both fuelled by and reinforcing legal inequalities, patriarchal social and cultural norms contribute to GBV prevalence and limit the ability of female survivors to seek redress. The perception that women and girls are different and inferior to men based on traditional gender roles makes them subject to abuse and violence. The concept of victim blaming is also rooted in these patriarchal social and cultural norms. Victim blaming is based on the idea that

when women face GBV, it is because they transgressed acceptable norms and deserve to be punished. Internalized patriarchy also means some women support or contribute to gender-based violence, either by normalizing it or being bystanders. Although trends clearly show that men are disproportionately perpetrators, it is worth noting that society also largely ignores and belittles male survivors. However, men are coming forward more as victims, especially young boys and gay and trans men (Irish Consortium on Gender-Based Violence 2019).

Although recent studies indicate the majority of the Lebanese population believe it is never

justifiable for a man to beat his wife, at least one in five men approve of violence towards women, agreeing with the statement “there are times when a woman deserves to be beaten” (IMAGES 2018). Agreement with this statement was notably higher amongst Syrian men than Lebanese men. More than a quarter of men and one in five women believe that women should tolerate violence at home. Concerningly, 7% of men reported that they forced their wives to have sex with them when their wives did not want to, and 15% of women surveyed had been raped by their husbands. Disaggregation by background characteristics highlighted that tolerance of violence is positively associated with being unmarried and with lower levels of education amongst men. Women who were married, from the older generation, and who had a lower educational level were also more likely to accept violence towards women. This suggests that there is higher tolerance for gender-based violence in more conservative and less educated communities (Ibid).

Recent research tends to show that more conservative communities have less access to education and information about GBV, less resources to tackle and cope with GBV, and more rigid interpretations of gender roles. Consultations in Akkar and the South affirmed that there is less reporting, more stigma, and less outreach about services in rural and conservative areas. In addition, according to recent data, there are concerning trends showing that youth may be becoming more conservative in certain parts of the country. Specifically, 41% of young men and 35% of young women across Lebanon disagreed that addressing VAW should be a priority during COVID-19, which was low compared with the relatively higher rates amongst all other age groups (UN Women 2021c).

Child marriage, designated a human rights violation by various international laws,⁹

is also an alarmingly common practice in Lebanon, especially in disadvantaged refugee communities and in Lebanese communities in more conservative areas where gender roles are more rigid. According to a baseline survey conducted by UNICEF in 2015-2016, 6% of Lebanese girls and women aged 20 to 24 were married before the age of 18, compared with 12% of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon and 25% of Palestinian refugees from Syria (Hutchinson 2015/2016). The 2020 VASyR found that 26% of Syrian refugee females aged 15-19 were married or had been engaged, separated, divorced, or widowed compared to 3% of Syrian refugee boys (UN Women 2020d). It is expected that these numbers will grow across all communities as families are forced into more desperate situations as a result of the current crises.

Largely due to stigma and accepted norms, GBV still goes widely underreported. In a recent study, only 24% of respondents reported that the women they knew who had experienced violence by a husband, a family member, or online had reported the violence, while for the remaining 76% no help was sought (UN Women 2021c). Instead, survivors are usually expected to endure domestic violence and reconcile with the perpetrator, often in order to maintain the honour of their family. If they pursue a legal case or even informal mediation, survivors may face retribution or ostracization by their families or broader communities. For example, in a 2021 study with 227 Syrian women, respondents reported not seeking justice due to being afraid of the consequences (65%), social stigma and shame (52%), and believing that reporting will not change anything (48%) (UN Women A2J Access to Justice Study, forthcoming). Security forces tasked with responding are often not equipped with survivor-centred response techniques, and they may even further humiliate survivors or perpetuate sexist norms.

⁹ These include: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). Available at <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm>, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989) Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx>, and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966). Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx>.

Queerphobic and Racist Attitudes

Racist, homophobic, and ableist norms and attitudes are also factors in GBV prevalence and the lack of recourse for GBV. Lebanese society is still largely homophobic, and homosexuality is criminalized, making it effectively impossible for LGBTIQ+ individuals to report GBV against them, even though they face high rates of discrimination and violence. According to a 2017 survey of 2,186 Lebanese and Syrian women and men, 37% of women and 68% of men agreed with laws to arrest and imprison people who engage in homosexual acts (IMAGES 2018). As discussed in numerous reports, LGBTIQ+ individuals are often terrified of authorities, who are more likely to subject them to further abuse than to provide support.¹⁰ For transgender women and gender non-conforming individuals, lacking accurate identification cards is a significant deterrent to seeking recourse for violence against them (and in seeking other forms of services, for that matter). Another

documented form of violence against LGBTIQ+ people is conversion therapy. LBQT women in particular are subjected to corrective rape, virginity tests, and are forced into heterosexual marriages (World Bank 2015). This must be understood as a gendered and feminist issue since these communities are being targeted for transgressing patriarchal norms around sexuality and gender. How they define and actualize gender is seen as a threat precisely because they break away from accepted social norms.

Specific attention is needed to address the gender discrimination specific to lesbian, bisexual, queer, and trans (LBTQ) women and gender non-conforming individuals. Global trends of patriarchal power structures in LGBTIQ+ communities mirror the context in Lebanon, where LBTQ women and gender non-conforming individuals face more gender-related barriers and discrimination than gay and transgender men (Kaedbey 2014). As a consequence, they confront even

¹⁰ Kill with transgender Lebanese woman.



more challenges in terms of accessing public life, acceptance, exposure to violence, and political participation than their male counterparts. For example, as of this writing, the majority of LGBTIQ+ organizations that operate within the HDP nexus in Lebanon are led by men.¹¹

Informed by patriarchal and racist attitudes, violence against migrant domestic workers has been addressed above. A significant contributor to the normalization of this violence is racist attitudes, which cause some to view migrant domestic workers as second-class citizens. According

to one study of employers of migrant domestic workers done by the ILO, roughly two-thirds of employers disagreed that their employees should be allowed to attend classes, meet with their friends, and attend organizational meetings, and nearly a quarter of employers reported sometimes or always locking migrant workers inside (ILO 2016). A 2014 study analysing 730 migrant worker complaints at the Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre found that one in ten complainants (70 out of 730) had been subjected to sexual violence (Nasri 2014).

SUB-TOPIC 3: UNDER-RESOURCED AND LIMITED-SERVICE PROVISION

Limited State Response, Dependency on GBV Aid

State-funded services and responses to GBV are very limited in Lebanon. There is no national referral system for GBV cases, there is widespread understaffing amongst family protection units in police stations, and GBV survivors are required to pay for services, like forensic tests in response to rape, court administrative fees, and legal representation. As of this writing, the primary state response system for reporting GBV is a hotline (1745) run by the Internal Security Forces (ISF), though the hotline is explicitly for domestic violence, not for all forms of GBV. While there have been significant increases in the number of women accessing the hotline and police issuance of protection orders and response to violence in the household, there are still large gaps in the national GBV response system. The 1745 hotline is not free; women must use credit to call the 4-digit pin. In addition, survivors with minority identities – refugees, migrants, and LGBTIQ+ people – have reported that they do not feel safe using it. In 2020, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) endorsed national standard operating procedures (SOPs) for responding

to GBV in Lebanon, but they have not been implemented and operationalized well due to the concurrent crises (UNHCR 2020).

Moreover, the administration of justice is fraught with discriminatory policies and practices, namely a lack of effective prosecution of perpetrators and patriarchal approaches to addressing cases of GBV. Such a gendered sociocultural context is pervasive at all levels of both formal and informal justice mechanisms, limiting the ability of women and girls, as well as gender minorities, to seek and successfully attain justice for their abuse. Men dominate law enforcement positions and high-level judiciary positions, often bringing with them biases informed by regressive gender norms. Male family and community members play a strong intervening role in deciding whether and how any form of justice is sought. This challenge of seeking justice is compounded by the fact that there are very few female police officers in Lebanon, despite studies showing that female GBV survivors feel more comfortable reporting instances of GBV to other women (Heise 2011). Allegations of sexual harassment from (male) officials in the security sector mean that many survivors do not trust the police and may only report

¹¹ Analysis of seven Lebanese LGBTIQ+ organizations.

violence in extreme cases.¹² Due to the criminalization of same-sex relations and other aspects of diverse gender expression and sexuality, LGBTIQ+ individuals who are survivors of GBV almost never approach authorities or seek recourse for abuse that happens to them; they are too often subjected to abuse from the authorities themselves or accused of crimes due to their gender identity or sexual orientation (HRW 2019a).

The lack of state and institutional capacity to effectively respond to GBV leaves service provision to a patchwork of NGOs. Many of these services emerged in response to the Syria refugee influx and over time have become more open to women of different backgrounds.¹³ To fill in gaps in service left by the state and in an effort to ensure service provision to those who are not as comfortable going to state security forces for assistance, NGOs developed a response system to GBV.¹⁴ However, these NGOs face challenges securing sustainable, long-term funding, are often overstretched, and coordination remains challenging for such services. For example, in May 2020, the Inter-Agency Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) Task Force in Lebanon listed approximately 70 hotlines (non-unique) available to survivors across the country to report GBV, often with different hotlines for different regions (Inter-Agency SGBV TF 2020). These hotlines are run by a few dozen international and national NGOs and are funding-dependent, meaning that these hotlines often have inconsistent capacity to sustain personnel to keep them functional. Moreover, the huge number of hotlines can mean that GBV survivors get confused about where to call and report. The Inter-Agency

SGBV Task Force regularly updates these hotlines, as well as the complimentary SGBV referral pathways for each region.¹⁵

In consultations, stakeholders noted that even the most effective and coordinated GBV response mechanisms managed through NGOs cannot ultimately replace a well-coordinated state-based mechanism. Yet, as discussed above, survivors often do not seek state support because they do not trust that these institutions would in fact help them. An effective response to GBV would involve inter-ministerial coordination as well as specific services available through healthcare providers. These responses should increase the clinical management of rape and healthcare providers and security personnels' capacity to document and report cases of abuse.

While NGOs are filling an important gap, very few services exist for women with specific backgrounds and needs. Organizations that respond to GBV cases often have very specific and narrow criteria. Currently, no shelters are able to accommodate women with access issues due to physical disabilities, and all shelters lack the capacity to handle mentally disabled women who likely require specific case management needs. Likewise, active shelters have either undefined or explicitly discriminatory policies on accepting transgender women and men, as well as gender non-conforming individuals.¹⁶ There are NGOs with a mandate to specifically support disabled, migrant, and LBTQ women, however, they are often rights-based organizations and do not have as much GBV expertise or resources to respond to the GBV cases they receive.

¹² See Baydas (2014). A number of key informants also raised this as a concern, and instances of harassment by security officials following the Beirut Port Explosion are also documented in the Rapid Intersectional Gender Analysis of the Beirut Port Explosion (UN Women 2020a).

¹³ According to a KII with a Lebanese NGO providing SGBV prevention and response services.

¹⁴ NGOs running shelters and providing services is a common practice in much of the world.

¹⁵ FMI on the Lebanon SGBV TF, please see here: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/working-group/23>

¹⁶ An LGBTIQ+ activist KII mentioned being told "If she still has a penis, she won't be allowed in the shelter" regarding admission of transgender women to a shelter in Beirut.

FINDINGS: SECTOR II SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN



OVERVIEW

Estimates suggest that the female labour force participation rate (FLFP) in Lebanon hovers at 29.3% (CAS 2019)¹⁷. However, up-to-date data on the impact of the current crisis in Lebanon is not available, and it is likely that FLFP has further decreased. A conservative estimate of women exiting from the labour force at the start of the economic crisis was 22%, but up-to-date analysis is needed (Salti 2020). Currently, more than half of the Lebanese population is estimated to be living below the poverty line.¹⁸ As the Lebanese pound depreciates, the price of basic goods is rapidly increasing, eroding people's ability to afford food, shelter, and healthcare, including sexual and reproductive health. This section discusses areas of focus for women in the economy, providing a portrait of women in the workforce, the institutional and informal barriers to their participation in the workforce, and how access to education and availability of childcare affect women's ability to work. It also includes a high-level gender analysis of women's participation in the economic sectors of focus under the forthcoming EU economic assistance strategy.

SUB-TOPIC 1: MACROECONOMIC POLICY

Lebanon has made progress in expanding protections for working women, yet significant gaps remain in the labour law that exclude certain groups.

Discrimination in the Labour Law

Certain clauses of the labour code discriminate against women. In 2000, Lebanon passed Labour Law 207, which stipulates under Article 26 that employers must not discriminate between men and women with regard to kind of work, salary, or wages, hiring, promotion, vocational training, or attire. While an important step, this article does not include a non-discrimination clause for sexual orientation and gender expression, meaning that LGBTIQ+ groups remain unprotected in the labour force.¹⁹

Although there is an (incomplete) non-discrimination clause by gender, gender discrimination persists in the labour law. Employers are prohibited from dismissing

women because of pregnancy by Articles 29 and 52 of the labour law, but prospective employers still have the right to ask about family status. One assessment found that a majority of the employers in Lebanon that were interviewed reported preferences for hiring men because of their beliefs surrounding women's role as caretakers at home, with some raising doubts about women's ability to take on management positions or jobs more suited for men (World Bank forthcoming). Discrimination is even higher against women from minority backgrounds. Very few public places are accessible to those with disabilities, and there are even fewer workplaces suitable for them.

The labour law also prohibits women from working in certain occupations considered arduous or hazardous, e.g., in the mining industry, welding and metalwork, glass work, production of alcohol, tannery work, and abattoir work (Republic of Lebanon 1946).

¹⁷ This report uses the official government data from the Labour Force Survey 2018-2019 (CAS). The percentages slightly differs from World Bank data where the labour force participation for women is 25 % and 79% for men.

¹⁸ A severe economic and financial crisis led to a projected 19.2% decline in GDP in 2020, triple digit inflation, and a projected increase in poverty to 45% and extreme poverty to 22% (World Bank 2021d). See Salti 2020 for a discussion on women's job losses during the economic crisis. See also ESCWA 2020.

¹⁹ International law stipulates protections based on gender do not only apply to women and men, but to all forms of gender identity. See OHCHR 2012.

However, reportedly, these laws are not well-enforced. In addition, most forms of agricultural labour are excluded from the labour law, and that exclusion has a huge impact on women. Nearly half of all agricultural workers are female, and the vast majority work informally as seasonal “freelance” workers (FAO 2021).

The current Labour Code extended maternity leave for women from 49 to 70 days with 100% of employee wages covered during leave (World Bank forthcoming). However, this is still below ILO’s international benchmark, which is a minimum of 14 weeks. There is also no legislation on paternity leave or parental leave.²⁰ This not only infringes on men’s parental rights, but it also continues to reinforce the structural burden on women to do more care work.

Discrimination in the Social Security Law

The Social Security Law discriminates against women through the application of welfare benefits, as men receive automatic monetary benefits (or allowances) for their children while women are entitled to such benefits only if their husband is dead or handicapped (Juraysati 1970). Another area of asymmetric treatment for women is Article 14, which guarantees insurance coverage for a non-employed wife of a contributing husband, but only allows a contributing wife insurance coverage for her husband if he is over 60 or disabled (Kukrety 2016; UN Women 2020). Same-sex couples have no insurance benefits, as they still do not have marital rights.

Inheritance Laws and Practices and Issues of Citizenship

Unequal inheritance laws and practices under Lebanon’s PSLs impact women’s economic positioning, as they result in women having less ownership over land. Under the rules of inheritance that apply to Muslims, women have a right to inherit, but in many cases, they

receive less inheritance than men, with the amount depending on the specific sect. Male and female Christians have equal inheritance rights under the Inheritance Law for Non-Muslims. In practice, parents typically give the inheritance to their sons before they die, often by selling contracts, in order to keep the lands and properties in the ‘family’, as they see their daughters as falling under the families of their sons-in-law (married and unmarried since unmarried daughters have the potential to ‘leave’ the family to join another through marriage). For example, UNDP estimates that only 13% of agricultural lands in Lebanon are owned by women (UNDP 2021b).

The discriminatory nationality law contributes to an unequal macroeconomic environment, leaving many citizens of mixed Lebanese descent and residents of other nationalities without Lebanese citizenship and under the imperative to apply for residency and work permits as foreigners for their entire adult lives.

Sexual Harassment Law of 2020

After years of lobbying by feminist groups and women’s rights actors, the Lebanese Parliament passed a sexual harassment law in 2020. This law, which penalizes harassment in the workplace and provides protection from retaliation for witnesses, is a step forward. However, the law falls short of international standards. Sexual harassment is addressed solely as a crime, neglecting prevention, labour law reforms, monitoring, and civil remedies (HRW 2021). It is also independent from both the labour law and the penal code and lacks any clear mechanism for implementation. Moreover, it fails to include migrant domestic workers, refugees, and LGBTIQ+ people, and as discussed elsewhere, these groups are highly vulnerable to workplace abuses.

²⁰ In 2018, a law was introduced by the government to grant men three days of paid paternity leave but has not yet been voted on by the Lebanese Parliament to date. More recently, a legal proposal on a paternity leave of 10 days was drafted by the NCLW and submitted to the Lebanese parliament in June 2021. However, it has yet to be discussed as of the writing of this report.

Labour Law and Non-Nationals Residing in Lebanon

Palestinian, Syrian, and other refugee populations, as well as migrant domestic workers and stateless persons living in Lebanon, are all effectively excluded from the Lebanese labour law entirely. Even though the vast majority of Palestinians residents were born in Lebanon, they are still considered foreigners and are required to obtain a work permit prior to employment in specific jobs, which is a lengthy administrative process.²¹ PRLs are prevented from obtaining employment in at least 39 professions (such as medicine, law, engineering, etc.) (UNRWA 2015). Changes to Lebanese law in 2005 and 2010 have, in principle, improved the rights of Palestinians in Lebanon (PRLs) to access formal employment and strengthened related social protection mechanisms, giving them partial access to the National Social Security Fund. However, significant gaps remain. Within this difficult legal context for Palestinian refugees where there are limited prospects for jobs, Palestinian women are even less likely to work.

The situation is similar for the 1.5 million Syrian refugees, of whom 23% of men and 18% of women lack legal residency (UN Women 2020d). Complicated processes involved with renewing residency, and in some cases outright denial, means that very few Syrians are properly documented so

cannot access formal work. Syrians are also limited to working in waste management, agriculture, and construction, sectors which have predominantly low wage labour opportunities and in which few women work. A lack of enforcement of labour laws and restrictions allows for employment of unregistered Syrian refugees without any protection from exploitation, illegal treatment by employers, or other workplace hazards. Syrians who work illegally are subject to arrest, detention, and deportation. The lack of access to fair job opportunities and decent work exacerbates the vicious cycle of impoverishment for Palestinians and Syrians, with particular hardships for women.

As discussed in the section on root causes of sexual and gender-based violence, foreign domestic workers are also excluded from the labour code and are subjected to a system of sponsorship (the Kafala System) that limits their access to social protection and increases their risk of exploitation.²² In September 2020, the Labour Ministry adopted a new standard unified contract that would have improved protections for migrant domestic workers. However, after the submission of a complaint from the Syndicate of the Owners of Recruitment Agencies to the Shura Council, the adoption of the contract was annulled (HRW 2020).

SUB-TOPIC 2: FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION²³

According to the most recent and comprehensive data, women in Lebanon participate – either through being employed or actively looking for a

job – in the labour force at a third of the rate of their male counterparts, a rate that has likely been further reduced with the onset of the economic

²¹ Jobs for which Palestinians must apply are determined by a decree issued on an annual basis by the Minister of Labour.

²² According to the ILO, Kafala is a sponsorship system that regulates the relationship between employers and migrant workers. “Under the Kafala system, which is also prevalent in the GCC countries, a migrant worker’s immigration status is legally bound to an individual employer or sponsor (kafeel) for their contract period. The migrant worker cannot enter the country, transfer employment, nor leave the country for any reason without first obtaining explicit written permission from the kafeel.”

²³ Labour force participation (or economically active) is defined as the share of the working age population that is in the labour force. The labour force includes employed workers and unemployed workers (those who are actively seeking work). The working age population here is defined as persons aged 15-64 as a fraction of the total population in per cent.

TABLE 2. PERCENT OF WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE

OVERALL	29.3%
SYRIAN WOMEN	12%
PALESTINIAN WOMEN	17%
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE WOMEN from SYRIAN	14%
WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES	5.5%
LBTQ	No data

crisis. At the end of 2019, the overall female labour force participation rate in Lebanon was very low, 25% overall, including Lebanese women and non-national women (Table 2). Amongst Syrian refugee women, women's participation rate is even lower, with only 12% in the labour force compared to 65% of refugee men (UN Women 2020d). In addition to participating in the labour force at lower rates, women in Lebanon have higher rates of unemployment²⁴ and are paid less. Of the 29.3% of women aged 15 and above who are participating in the labour force, 14% were unemployed compared to 10% of men (CAS 2019).

Even fewer women are in the labour force in areas outside of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. As the cities are known to be major economic, social, and cultural hubs, it is not surprising that labour force participation rates in Beirut and Mount Lebanon are higher than the country average, at 37% and 35% respectively. Participation of women in the labour market is considerably lower in northern and southern governorates, with rates as low as 15% in Akkar, 21% in Nabatieh, and 23% in Bekaa (CAS 2019). However, women are reportedly present in the agricultural and agro-food sectors in these areas, undertaking work for little or no pay, which is often not reported as productive work.²⁵ Women most commonly

work in the education, health, and public sectors (36%), the service sector (35%), and trade sectors (15%), compared to men who most commonly work in trade (22%), the public sector (20%), and manufacturing (13%) (CAS 2019).

The economic crisis coupled with the effects of COVID-19 and the 4th August 2020 explosion in the Beirut port is widening the labour force gender gap by reducing both actual jobs and women's economic participation. As of June 2021, updated nation-wide statistics had not been gathered on the extent to which the crisis has impacted households in Lebanon, making it difficult to ascertain the extent to which the crisis has impacted different groups, including different types of women. However, preliminary assessments show women suffering higher job loss and income reduction as a result of the crisis. According to a survey of 3,740 Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians undertaken by the World Food Programme in June 2020, job reductions hit Syrian women hardest: 61% of Syrian women reported losing their jobs due to COVID-19 compared to 46% of Syrian men (World Food Programme 2020). Women also face increased care responsibilities, with lockdowns and school closures potentially

²⁴ Employment rate: Share of the working age population that is employed during a specified period of either one week or one day in paid employment: (a) at work: persons who, during the reference period, performed some work for wage or salary, in cash or in kind; (b) with a job but not at work: persons who, having already worked in their present job, were temporarily not at work during the reference period and had a formal attachment to their job or self-employment: (a) at work: persons who, during the reference period, performed some work for profit or family gain, in cash or in kind (b) with an enterprise but not at work: persons with an enterprise (which may be a business enterprise, a farm or a service undertaking) who were temporarily not at work during the reference period for any specific reason.

²⁵ See section on agriculture for further information.

adding to pre-existing inequalities at home. Indeed, 70% of respondents in the ILO study said their household duties had increased at the onset of the pandemic (ILO et al. 2020). Comprehensive, nation-wide, data is needed to better understand the impact of COVID-19 and the economic crisis on female labour force participation, but significant job loss and increased care work are obvious themes emerging.

Work in Lebanon is highly informal, particularly amongst low-skilled Lebanese and non-Lebanese populations. Overwhelmingly, non-Lebanese populations such as Syrians, Palestinians, and migrants are more likely than Lebanese to work in the informal sector,²⁶ with no social security coverage, no paid sick leave, and no paid annual leave (91% versus 28% for Lebanese employees overall). Here there is a significant gender difference as well, as 89% of non-Lebanese women work informally compared to 49% of non-Lebanese men (CAS 2019).

Prior to the economic crisis, foreign nationals in Lebanon held a larger percentage of jobs than Lebanese citizens,²⁷ however, Palestinian and Syrian women were economically active at very low rates. The most recently reported LFP was 17% for Palestinian refugee women from Lebanon and 14% for Palestine refugee women from Syria (PRS) (UNRWA 2016). The unemployment rate for PRS was double that of Palestine refugees from Lebanon, with female PRS reporting a 68% unemployment rate (UNRWA 2016). Both employed Palestinian men (39%) and women (27%) most commonly work in elementary occupations (daily work), and women are far more commonly found in professional jobs (21% of women compared to 5% of men). For Syrian refugee women, the labour force participation rate stands at 12% (UN Women 2020d). As with the Lebanese population, there is geographic variation,

since Palestinian and Syrian women in Beirut and Mount Lebanon had the highest labour force participation rates amongst the governorates.

Most Syrian refugee women live in highly unstable and vulnerable situations, facing issues such as lack of civil documentation,²⁸ family separation (including the loss of male heads of household who previously provided the household's main source of income), unstable and substandard housing, food insecurity, interrupted education, and limited freedom of movement, all factors that increase their risk of gender-based violence and reduce their likelihood of participation in the workforce. The most common sector of work for Syrian refugee women is agriculture, in which approximately half of working Syrian women work (UN Women et al. 2020). These women are concentrated in the Bekaa and Northern governorates, live in informal tented settlements, and are reportedly connected to farming opportunities through their community leader, or shawish, often in exchange for a portion of their pay (ILO 2018).

There are no overall statistics on LGBTQ+ persons in Lebanon, meaning there is no information on the extent to which they participate in the workforce. LBQT+ women and gender non-conforming individuals report being discriminated against based on their gender identity or sexual orientation, but the data gap means the nature, scale, and extent of discrimination remains largely uninterrogated.²⁹

Only 5.5% of women with disabilities participate in the workforce, which is the lowest participation rate of any single group of women (CAS 2019). Law number 2000/220 sets out an employment quota for persons with disabilities in the public and private sectors, stating that employers with more

²⁶ Informal Employment is defined as: the share of workers not contributing to social security.

²⁷ According to the 2017-2018 LFHLCS (CAS 2019), the labour force participation rate of non-Lebanese was 61% compared with 46% for Lebanese. It is unclear to what extent this figure has been impacted by the economic crisis.

²⁸ Overall rates of legal residency are very low as only 23% of men have work permits (UN Women 2020d).

²⁹ Interviews with organizations working on LGBTQ+ issues.

than 60 employees must employ a quota of 3% workers with disabilities (ILO 2013). However, this law lacks enforcement measures and the support needed to make the labour market inclusive for persons with disabilities. Little targeted research has been done on the explicit reasons for the low labour force participation rate of disabled people, but consultation participants suggested reasons could include the lack of accessible job opportunities for those with physical disabilities and prevailing norms that lead people to believe that disabled people should not, cannot, and do not need to work.³⁰

Women make up an estimated 76% of all migrant workers and 99% of migrant domestic workers who come to Lebanon for employment.³¹ They have no minimum wage, and their salaries are uniformly low – an average of 180 USD per month (prior to the financial crisis) (UN Women et al 2021c). Migrant domestic workers' wages are often withheld. Of 374 cases assisted by IOM between 2020-2021, this had happened in 73% of instances (UN Women 2021b). Many human rights organizations say that such abuses amount to modern slavery (Amnesty International 2019). According to migrant worker advocates, there is an increasing trend of migrants working as freelance labourers because Lebanese employers are no longer able to pay for workers to live with them.³² This trend is concerning because it translates into higher rates of undocumented labourers, since under Kafala, migrant domestic workers' contracts are tied to specific employers.

Key programmes that exist in support of women's economic empowerment are skills training and cash for work programmes that

specifically target women. A large number of survey respondents had participated in skills training (40%) and/or cash for work programmes (26%), and they had positive things to say about these programmes. The 41% of respondents who were currently employed felt that women's economic empowerment and livelihoods programmes had helped them find jobs, and that the programming overall supports women economically. However, nearly half of the survey respondents in either type of programme were not currently employed, and those who attended skills training said they attended training sessions mainly to leave their homes, expand their social networks, and learn skills, but not necessarily to find jobs. On the other hand, cash for work programme participants were more likely to say they joined in order to learn skills and find jobs.

Of the 40% of SSGA respondents who had partaken in skills training programmes, the most common programmes they participated in were tailoring (30%), handicrafts (17%), cooking/catering (16%), beauty care (14%), and education (12%), all traditionally feminized sectors. Overall, 87% of survey respondents agreed that participating in skills training programmes leads to improved chances for women to have jobs in the long-term, with no variation between Syrian and Lebanese responses. More than half (56%) of SSGA survey respondents who were currently working said they felt additional skills training would allow them to improve their ability to work in their sector and increase their income. Some respondents also said that social insurance provision (31%), help with household upkeep (23%), and physical and mental healthcare provision (21% each) were the best entry points to improving their job prospects.

³⁰ Interview with a disability rights advocate. This is also backed up by the LFHLC findings on gender differences that were evident for different types of disabilities. Women are more likely than men to have walking-related disabilities (65.2% for women vs. 51.4% for men) (CAS 2019).

³¹ This estimate is based on a gender breakdown of the total number of migrant work permits issued in 2019 (241,524), as per Ministry of Labour data (Ministry of Labour, n.d). This calculation excludes migrant workers who are in irregular status or those who are not regulated by the Ministry of Labour (e.g., female artists who are regulated by the Ministry of Tourism). Total permits issued to migrant workers (including Syrians): (female: 182,449 | Total permits issued to migrant domestic workers: 184,196 (female: 182,449 | male: 59,075).

³² Interview with representatives from a Lebanese NGO working on migrant workers' rights.

BOX 2. **THE NATIONAL POVERTY TARGETING PROGRAM (NPTP) AND GENDER**

The National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) is Lebanon's first poverty-targeted social assistance program by the governmental. The objective of the NPTP is to provide social assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese households based on transparent criteria that assess each household's eligibility to receive assistance, given the available public resources. The NPTP is implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) with support from the World Bank, EU, and UN agencies. Gender equality issues are too often overlooked in the delivery of cash assistance, assuming it to be gender neutral. However, effective cash assistance systems must consider women's eligibility and access, risks and exposure to gender-based violence, include sexual exploitation and abuse, and decision making and agency in household spending. Cash assistance holds the opportunity to significantly transform gender roles and power dynamics in.

According to data from 2019, only 13% of NPTP beneficiary households are female headed households (FHHs) (MOSA 2019), although FHHs are estimated at 18% of the national population and are overrepresented among Lebanon's urban and rural poor (CAS 2018/19). Findings also suggest that most decision making on how and where to use the food ecard entitlements are made mutually by heads of household (53%), with 37% of HHHs' decisions made solely by women (37%), and very few made solely by men (10%) (MOSA, WFP et al. 2021). Although gender-related indicators are included in the post-distribution monitoring program of the NPTP, more qualitative work is needed to ensure cash assistance is delivered equally to men and women in need and provided in a manner that positively transforms gender relations.

A smaller proportion (26%) of respondents had participated in cash for work programmes, which were most commonly in the same sectors as skills trainings (tailoring, beauty, handicrafts, cooking). Similar to skills training participants, 43% of these respondents were currently unemployed. Despite this fact,

86% agreed that partaking in cash for work programmes leads to improved chances for women to have jobs in the long term. In the SSGA survey, 24% of respondents said their current work was unrewarding, and 22% reported receiving less pay for the same work as men.

GENDER ANALYSIS OF EU ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE STRATEGY SUB-SECTORS

The EU has preliminarily selected four sectors as part of its 2021-2027 economic strategy: the knowledge economy, tourism, agriculture, and industry.³³ Table 3 shows the match between where women are working versus their interest

in these sectors. The sections below offer some preliminary gender analysis of these sectors, though a more in-depth understanding of the gender dynamics, opportunities, and challenges of each sector is needed.

³³ EU Economic strategy is based on analysis being conducted by the research firm, Triangle. Sectors are corroborated by the findings of a report that identified the knowledge economy, tourism, financial services, real estate, and construction and retail and commerce as those with the highest direct economic potential in 2025 (McKinsey 2019).

TABLE 3. WHERE WOMEN ARE WORKING AND SECTORS IN WHICH THEY ARE INTERESTED IN WORKING³⁴

Sector	Average Preference Rating out of 5	% Of Working Women in the Sector
Knowledge economy	1.9	3%
Tourism	2.1	4%
Agriculture	2.5	12%
Industrial	2.6	2%

Source: SSGA Survey 2021

Knowledge Economy (Digital Transformation)³⁵

As highlighted by the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, the knowledge economy³⁶ has been widely recognized as essential to the global economic future. In 2017, the ICT sector only accounted for approximately 2% of Lebanon's gross domestic product (GDP), yet it was identified as a sector with significant growth potential given Lebanon's highly skilled and multilingual workforce (GIZ 2019). At a time when Lebanon is undergoing significant economic changes that entail largely reduced domestic markets and diminished purchasing power, expanding access to international markets and digital jobs has potential as a mitigation measure against economic collapse and brain drain.

Lebanon is widely recognized as a talent hub in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.³⁷ While according to the International Telecommunication Union there is a 14% gender gap in terms of internet access across

the MENA region, no comprehensive gender-disaggregated information on internet access and media usage is available for Lebanon, making it difficult to ascertain the extent to which a digital gender divide exists (ITU 2021). However, there are already concerns that women are being left out in the development of this sector (Nefesh-Clarke 2020). Stakeholders interviewed for this study pointed to the need to improve women's digital literacy and digital marketing skills. Online work is potentially more accessible to women, especially LGBTQ women, mothers, and women with disabilities, who may be more comfortable working from home, though it does hold the potential to increase, or at least not alleviate, the double burden of paid work and unpaid care work.³⁸

Tourism

Tourism jobs include work in travel agencies, recreation, agritourism (such as staying in family homes), the food and beverage sector, and in hotels and accommodations. Lebanon has a historically vibrant

³⁴ Based on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 = uninterested and 5 = very interested.

³⁵ One respondent remarked, "How are women going to work in a country with export needs? Unless you are present digitally you don't exist. Digital skills are number one, and with this comes a whole battery of rights."

³⁶ The knowledge economy is considered to be audio-visual jobs (television, media, reporting), social media marketing, technology and services (e.g., selling hardware or software), and research and/or development of technology. It intersects with the concept of the digital economy, in which all other identified sectors (agriculture, industry, services etc.) operate through the usage of the latest digital technologies which allow for better and more efficient management and operations as well as easier access to regional and international markets (Merhej 2020).

³⁷ According to the 2018 Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index, Lebanon ranks 59th out of 137 countries, and INSEAD's Global Talent Competitiveness Index ranking of 2019 put Lebanon in fourth place for "New product entrepreneurial activity" (Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute 2019; INSEAD 2019).

³⁸ This was mentioned in two interviews with respondents representing the LGBTQ community as well as by a respondent who is a disability rights advocate.

tourist sector, including travel agencies, recreation initiatives, agritourism, the food and beverage sector, and hotels and accommodations, which contribute to the domestic economy as a major source of income and employment. In 2016, the total travel and tourism contribution was around 19% of Lebanon's GDP. (Bankmed 2017). However, Lebanon was hard-hit by the 2020-2021 coronavirus pandemic, and tourism has been on the decline.

Data on women in the tourism industry is sparse, but what is available points to a gender gap of 3% between men and women working in service and sales. Only 4% of the 623 women surveyed in the SSGA survey had worked or were currently working in the tourism sector. However, respondents showed relatively high interest in the sector, particularly Lebanese women in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. On the whole, women were most interested in working in the food and beverage sector and in hotels and accommodations.

Agriculture

48%
of working
Syrian
women are
employed in
agriculture

Agriculture includes planting and picking crops, food processing and agro-businesses, fisheries and aquaculture, animal production, and husbandry. Women's agricultural labour does not seem to be accurately captured in national surveys,

likely because of the highly informal nature of the work and because much of the work for women is unpaid. According to an assessment by the FAO, women represent almost half of Lebanon's agricultural workforce, but the most recent Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey of 2019 reported that women comprised only 13% of the agriculture sector (FAO 2021).

According to the VASyR 2021, approximately half of working Syrian women are working in agriculture, most commonly in Bekaa and in northern governorates (UN Women 2020d). A number of studies have shown that women working in agriculture, particularly Syrians, are subjected to specific labour rights violations and protection issues. The FAO study reports that women in agriculture earn around two thirds to one half as much as men, remain unprotected by labour laws, and rarely own the land they cultivate (FAO 2021). According to an ILO study, the average estimated monthly income for women in agriculture in Akkar was \$130-\$200 per month, while for men wages were \$660-\$990 per month. Wages are lower for Syrian and Palestinian refugee workers (and have likely been reduced during the economic crisis) (ILO 2018). Vulnerability exploitation is common, as shawish-leaders of informal tent settlements and landowners in rural areas often recruit women and girls and negotiate working terms on their behalf, taking part or all their salaries (Plan International 2018). In some areas, women and girls' relationships with the local shawish take on the form of indentured servitude, where they work in exchange for shelter, or debt bondage, where they work to pay off debts, often incurred as a result of displacement (The Freedom Fund 2016).

Given the increasing cost of food during the economic crisis, more people in Lebanon may turn to agricultural cultivation. According to a KII working on issues of gender and agriculture, this trend has already been observed.³⁹

Industry

In 2018, the industrial sector accounted for around 8% of Lebanon's GDP (USD 4.2 billion) and employed 20% of the local labour force (around 318,000 employees). There are over 4,700 industrial firms in Lebanon with 26%, or 1,245, industries manufacturing agri-food products, followed by construction materials (12%) and chemical products (8%) (IDAL 2021). Very few women appear to be employed in

³⁹ According to a KII with an environmentalist expert.

Industry. According to the 2019 LFHCLS, women accounted for approximately 7% of the total jobs in this sector, and only 2% of the 623 SSGA survey respondents who had worked or were currently working did so in this sector. However, when grouped with work in the creative sector,⁴⁰

the World Bank reports that Lebanon's creative industries have strong growth potential because of the presence of a highly creative workforce and large number of artists, many of whom, as consultation respondents highlighted, are women.

SUB-TOPIC 3: THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Policies, practices, codes of conduct (or lack thereof), and gendered norms in the business environment impact women's ability to work and their feelings of safety and security in the workplace. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent 95% of all companies in Lebanon and account for 50% of national employment, since they hire 2-4 employees, on average. Nearly ten percent (9.9%) of those companies are owned or co-owned by women, and women make up around 20% of the labour force of MSMEs. With only 9.9% female-owned or co-owned businesses, that

Lebanon falls below the MENA average of 19%, and only 5% of these businesses are majority female owned (World Bank & The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and European Investment Bank 2019). There is evidence that firms led by women tend to employ a larger proportion of female permanent full-time workers (49%) compared to firms led by men (22%) (Ibid). Assessments following the Beirut Port Explosion also reflected this trend (UN Women 2020a).

A recent World Bank survey of a nationally representative sample of 227 women owned and

⁴⁰ This includes cultural transmedia such as publishing, music, and videogames, performing arts, heritage management, and professional creative services.



led business in Lebanon found that they tend to be concentrated in the following sectors: wholesale and retail trade (27%), food and beverage (18%), manufacturing (10%), fashion and design (9%), and arts, entertainment, and recreation (7%). It also found that while women's concentration in the following sectors is low, these sectors offer high export potential: professional/scientific and technical activities (7%), ICT (6%), education (3%), and tourism services (1%) (World Bank 2021a).

Despite the low levels of female entrepreneurship in Lebanon, a study conducted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2019 on 1,600 Lebanese companies testifies to the potential that women have in leading and managing sustainable enterprises. The study revealed that 50% of the sampled companies had female board members, and that women represented 14% of all board members. Furthermore, 47% had one to two female board members and 3% of the companies had three to four female board members. Companies with female board members exhibited double the return on equity (20.7% compared to 10.3% for all-male boards), and 2.3% higher growth in return on assets (IFC 2013).

A significant barrier to increasing the participation of women in business in Lebanon is women's lack of access to financial assets and markets. Based on the aforementioned World Bank survey, of the 277 companies surveyed, 80% of respondents cited access to finance and information as the most significant enabling factors to scale and export (World Bank 2021a). In Lebanon, only 3% of bank loans go to female entrepreneurs (IFC 2013). In 2017, 57% of men in Lebanon had accounts in financial institutions compared to 33% of women (World Bank forthcoming). This gender gap is due to the fact that women often depend on male family members for access to financial services. Lack of money and the fact that male family members are more likely to have accounts are two of the most common reasons stated for this. Survey respondents in the World Bank assessment cited the lack of a business strategy as the most significant internal barrier; 65% stated that they had no international representation,

PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING WOMEN IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

1. Establish high-level corporate leaders for gender equality.
2. Treat all women and men fairly at work – respect and support human rights and non-discrimination.
3. Ensure the health, safety and well-being of all women and men workers.
4. Promote education, training, and professional development for women.
5. Implement enterprise development, supply chain and marketing practices that empower women
6. Promote equality through community initiatives and advocacy.
7. Measure and publicly report on progress to achieve gender equality.

Source: Women's Empowerment Principles, UN Women and UN Global Compact

hindering their ability to access international markets. In addition, despite women's contribution to agricultural production, women have restricted access to land ownership, an asset which significantly supports business development. Little is known about female entrepreneurs' access to national and international procurement supply chains in Lebanon, though a lack of networks and the gender gap in financial inclusion are likely to affect their access to markets, and thereby their sustainability and growth.

As discussed under the section on legal norms, discriminatory recruitment and employment practices persist in the private

sector, though only 18% of respondents to the World Bank survey cited gender norms as a significant challenge in their ability to grow their businesses. In addition to workplace gender discrimination, men often harass women in the workplace and subject them to verbal abuse (World Bank 2021a). Of the 623 SSGA survey respondents who had worked in the past or were currently working, 17% said they had been sexually harassed at work. While sexual harassment in the workplace is finally criminalized, enforcement measures and reporting protocols for individual businesses are sparse.

SUB-TOPIC 4: NORMS, FAMILY LIFE, AND UNPAID CARE WORK

It is well-documented that social norms continue to prevent women from entering the paid labour force. Prevailing data reveal persisting gender norms related to women and work and continued lack of support from their male partners in the undertaking of childcare, healthcare, and household tasks. As previously mentioned, more than one quarter (31%) of women surveyed in the SSGA had never even considered engaging in paid work. The reasons provided for never having considered getting a job were clear reflections of these social norms: 26% said it was due to childcare responsibilities, 23% said they did not have the necessary education or skills, 22% said their spouses would not allow it, and 19% pointed to their household responsibilities. While factors such as salaries and benefits are important, what mattered most in a job for women surveyed in 2018 were the working hours, proximity to home, and the working environment (IMAGES 2018). Women are more likely to be absent from work to care for children or family members than men, and women consider issues such as flexibility, having no small children at home, availability of a nursery, and encouragement from their

spouse's family to a larger extent than men when deciding whether to work (World Bank forthcoming).

Statistically speaking, marriage and children are highly significant determinants of a woman's likelihood to work in Lebanon. Being married reduces the likelihood of joining the labour force for women, particularly after the ages of 25-34. This is also true amongst Syrian and Palestinian women. Syrian women reported care work as their main reason to not work, while Palestinian FLFP for married women is only 10%, less than half that of single women (23%).⁴¹

Men remain largely absent from unpaid care labour, reinforcing women's roles at home and contributing to low FLFP. An estimated 96% of married women reported participating in housework related to traditional roles such as washing clothes, preparing food, and cleaning the home; only 68% of men reported doing the same (IMAGES 2018). These expectations that women will do housework greatly influence women's access to employment. In addition to caring for children, there are social expectations

⁴¹ Dependent children and other family members were the main reasons cited for not working, in addition to lack of work in the area where they live (UNICEF 2021). Palestinian FLFP figures are from UNRWA 2015.

that women care for elderly parents on both sides of the family. Mothers of children with disabilities face extra burdens, and older adolescent girls often tend to support their mothers, potentially detracting from their educational and/or work opportunities.

Norms play an important role in shaping the discourse around childcare and the options women have to lessen their unpaid care burden. In a 2018 survey, 63% of women and men said they believe paid childcare (care by non-family members) could negatively affect children (World Bank forthcoming). Formal childcare services such as community based childcare centres, Social Development Centres (SDCs), and private daycare are available, though limited and often unaffordable.⁴² A 2021 survey on childcare needs with 195 women in urban and rural areas found that few participants (13%) used the SDCs, private daycares, or services offered

by the NGOs and instead relied on their families, largely women relatives.⁴³ However, at least half said they would prefer to have formal daycare services, and the vast majority stated that childcare is a huge factor in whether or not they work. Most respondents said that if services were available, they would use them. A separate study found that 71% of working Syrian refugee women reported challenges in the availability of childcare (those who report having childcare were married women, and typically it was provided by a family member), and 38% struggled to maintain household needs while working (UN Women 2021a). Childcare needs are often more pronounced for women migrant domestic workers, as their children often lack the necessary documentation and are unable to even go to school. Instead, they tend to rely on community-based networks that are not always reliable.⁴⁴

⁴² UN Women childcare study, forthcoming in 2021.

⁴³ UN Women childcare study, forthcoming in 2021.

⁴⁴ KII with a migrant domestic worker and community leader.



SUB-TOPIC 5: EDUCATION AS A FACTOR OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

The more educated a woman is in Lebanon, the more likely she is to participate in the labour force (CAS 2019). There is a stronger association between education levels and labour force participation for women as compared to men. Male labour force participation does not change much between education levels (from primary to university), but for women, participation rates increase substantially when they have a university education.

Consultation respondents, particularly those in Mount Lebanon and the North, were concerned about the impact of Lebanon's current crises on women's access to decent work and education, particularly for low-income families. As a largely privatized industry, education is becoming more expensive relative to income and costs during the economic crisis, and this expense increase could cause students, particularly female students, to drop out, slowing or reversing the upward trend in girls' access to education in recent decades. Moreover, some consultation participants pointed to the fact that the current education curricula perpetuate unequal gender norms as a key challenge in achieving gender equality in Lebanon. In addition to macroeconomic advocacy, consultation respondents were interested in working within education institutions to challenge gender norms at young ages. Examples included working with the Ministry of Education to implement more gender-sensitive curricula, implementing sexual education curricula (which are effectively absent), equipping schools with necessary

technological equipment, promoting girls' interest in science, technology, engineering, and math, and supporting early childhood education.

Non-Lebanese people face significant barriers to obtaining education. The percentage of illiterate non-Lebanese people (11%) was almost double that of Lebanese people (6%) (CAS 2019). University attendance is nearly the same for men and women (including those of both Lebanese and non-Lebanese nationalities). However, amongst Syrian refugees, female youth and adults face more barriers to accessing educational opportunities. According to the VASyR 2020, 89% of young Syrian refugee women, compared with 57% of young Syrian refugee men between the ages of 19-24, were not in education, employment, or training (UN Women 2020d).

Transgender people transitioning during primary or secondary education usually drop out due to bullying, stigma, and gender discrimination combined with family rejection, which puts them at a disadvantage in the labour market (HRW 2019a). Alternatively, they wait to conduct gender affirmation transitions until after they have completed their education, which has health impacts. Limitations on their access to education is under-researched. Migrant domestic workers' children, estimated to number 15,000, but also without clear data, often lack documentation, which means they are unable to enrol in school (Insan Association 2021).

SUB-TOPIC 6: SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS

There are concerns that access to sexual and reproductive health and rights is deteriorating due to the economic crisis. The provision of sexual healthcare for the most vulnerable is done through public primary healthcare centres across Lebanon. In conservative and rural communities, access to SRHR and sexual health

education is limited and, as such, women's vulnerability to unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and STIs is increased (Alomair 2020). Refugee women in Lebanon are particularly affected by the lack of access to high-quality family planning and reproductive health services (including antenatal, delivery, and

emergency care), which puts them at risk for unwanted pregnancy and unsafe deliveries. Indeed, the maternal mortality rate for non-Lebanese women is 29 deaths per 100,000 live births, quadruple that of Lebanese women (6.1 births in 100,00) (UNDP and CAS forthcoming). Studies show that doctor and treatment fees as well as transportation costs remain major impediments to reproductive healthcare access (UN Women et al. 2020d). Stigma in healthcare is another issue, as female patients are typically asked about their marital status before health consultations about their sexual activity. LBTQ women, particularly those in rural areas, also suffer from limited access as the only centres sensitized to their needs are in Beirut.⁴⁵

It should be noted that SRHR for migrant domestic workers is heavily restricted. Women migrant domestic workers are excluded from the Lebanese Labour Law's maternity protections and benefits, and under Kafala, their sexual, reproductive, and maternal rights are not protected. While their employment contract does not explicitly forbid them to marry or have children, there are widespread customary practices that prevent them from exercising these rights. Many women migrant domestic workers are required by recruitment agencies to take a pregnancy test before and after arriving in Lebanon, and if they are pregnant upon arrival, they will not be allowed to stay (UN Women 2021b). Women live-in migrant domestic

workers who get pregnant during their contract period are often forced to terminate their employment and leave Lebanon. If they stay, they are often pushed into an irregular legal status, which can result in them living without legal residency or protection.

Moreover, the economic crisis is threatening women and girls' access to basic hygiene materials. As mentioned previously, period poverty describes the struggle many low-income and displaced women and girls face in affording adequate menstrual hygiene products. The term also refers to the increased economic vulnerability women and girls face due the financial burden posed by the necessity of menstrual hygiene supplies. 700,000⁴⁶ women are forecasted to be unable to meet their most basic hygienic and safety needs as a result of the current crisis.⁴⁷ The cost of sanitary products (both imported and locally produced) has been increasing at an alarming rate, with an overall increase of around 320% since October 2019.⁴⁸ In April 2020, 66% of those surveyed by Plan International in Lebanon asserted that they did not have the financial means to buy menstrual hygiene supplies (Plan International 2020). This situation is exacerbated in refugee camps, where more and more adolescent Syrian refugee and Lebanese girls report that they no longer have the financial means to buy sanitary products (Ibid.).

⁴⁵ KII with an NGO providing sexual health and reproductive services.

⁴⁶ Based on a poverty rate of 50% and 1.4 million Lebanese women using sanitary pads.

⁴⁷ With the lifting of subsidies, the share of the food basket from a family income will increase to more than 60%, leaving little room to purchase sanitary pads for a household.

⁴⁸ UN calculations based on the average increase in the price of a 10 pack of pads from October 2019 to May 2021.



FINDINGS: SECTOR III
WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP
AND PARTICIPATION IN
PUBLIC AND POLITICAL
LIFE, INCLUDING
MATTERS OF PEACE
AND SECURITY

OVERVIEW

Considering the systematic exclusion and persistent low representation of women in all levels of politics and leadership in Lebanon, enhancing women's political participation has been a long-time priority for feminist and human rights actors in Lebanon. Beyond their low representation in traditional political structures, such as the parliament and municipal councils, women have also been systematically excluded from peace-making and political dialogues in Lebanon and are underrepresented in key peace and security institutions, such as Lebanon's security forces. Global evidence points to the positive correlation between diversity and representation within national and international security apparatuses, levels of community trust, and the effectiveness of efforts to prevent violent extremism (OSCE 2019). Moreover, there is a wealth of global evidence which shows that a strong and cohesive women's movement is a key driver of social and legal change (UN Women 2015b) when paired with a critical mass of women in politics (Bratton and Ray 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) and that peace processes are more likely to stick when they are representative and women are involved.

Stakeholders involved in working to enhance women's political participation emphasize the importance of calling for diverse institutions and women in leadership while expanding work on this subject beyond traditional elected roles and understanding of politics. Other forms of political organizing such as syndicates, unions, student clubs and organizations, and activist organizing and supporting a strong women's movement are also key for building women's leadership in Lebanon.

TABLE 4. WOMEN IN ELECTED POSITIONS

Branch	Number	Percentage
Cabinet Members	6 out of 20	30%
Parliament	6 out of 128	5%
Municipal Governments	663 out of 12,139	5%
Mukhtars	57 out of 2,896	2%

SUB-TOPIC 1: WOMEN IN ELECTED AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

Lebanon was the first country in the Arab region to give women the right to vote in 1952. While there has been some recent progress, the representation of women in Lebanon's political arena remains very low.

As of June 2021, women represent 30% of ministerial posts, with the first ever Lebanese and Arab women Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense appointed to office.⁴⁹ The 2018 parliamentary elections saw

⁴⁹ In 2019, only 13% of ministers were women, including Raya Hassan, the first female Minister of the Interior.

significant changes in the number of women registering, with 113 women registering to run (an increase from 12 in 2009) and 86 running for office. The vast majority of those women ran for seats in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Despite the increase in the number of women who ran, very few won. Only 4.6% of national parliamentarians are women (six women out of 128 parliamentarians, though this is currently five due to one female Member of Parliament resigning after the August 2020 Beirut Port Explosion). Feminist charter signatories pointed out how a lack of transparency in election laws and political party proceedings makes entering politics very difficult for “newcomers” in politics in general, and in particular for women.⁵⁰

In addition to low parliamentary representation, women currently represent only 5.4% of the country's municipal councillors and 1.9% of mukhtars (UNDP 2016). Although LBQT women and women with disabilities are highly active in reform efforts, they have almost no representation in formal political leadership, and there are few politicians who champion or include causes related to these groups in their platforms.⁵¹ Those interviewed for this study highlighted the importance of facilitating women's involvement in local politics as well as in the national government, considering how municipalities and local councils play large roles in the day-to-day service provision and rights promotion for women.

A range of factors prevent women from attaining formal leadership roles, including male dominated clientelist networks, undemocratic and opaque political structures, prohibitive costs, insufficient and often sexist media representation, and

legal barriers. Despite being a country of confessional quotas, Lebanon does not have gender quotas for national elected bodies, although some traditional and emerging political parties have applied gender quotas within their own internal structures. A longstanding political aim of feminist stakeholders, a gender quota has yet to materialize, despite evidence for its broad support. According to one survey, 81% men and 91% of women supported a fixed proportion of places, or quotas, for women in the Parliament and the Cabinet (IMAGES 2018). The SSGA survey results confirmed this high level of support (at least amongst women), with 81% of women across all backgrounds supporting these quotas. Quotas are seen as one of the most straightforward and viable solutions to the problem of low female representation in politics and leadership roles. On the other hand, stakeholders interviewed for this study reported that putting women in positions of power should not be an end in itself, and they discussed the need to politically empower women with feminist agendas.⁵²

In addition, specific facets of the electoral laws including preferential voting, districting, and financing policies create disadvantages for women. Although women running in municipal and parliamentary elections are now allowed to register and run outside of the areas where their husbands live, this was only approved by the parliament in September 2017 (USAID 2017). However, for voting, a woman who marries a man from another area will be added to the register in her husband's area. This means that for both parliamentary and municipal elections, she can only cast her

⁵⁰ Discrimination is rampant in political parties, where male competitors are almost always privileged for candidacies above equally or more qualified women. Since the Lebanese Civil War, paternal figures from specific families have had effective hegemony over political structures and state resources, making it exceptionally difficult for women – and newcomers more generally – to enter politics. Traditional political parties often see little strategic value in promoting women in their ranks due to patriarchal and conservative values and because female candidates are likely lesser known.

⁵¹ As an exception, the Kataeb party did call for and include the decriminalization of homosexuality in their electoral programme in 2018. They also co-drafted the law to repeal art. 534 from the penal code, which Proud Lebanon is lobbying for (Vogt 2018).

⁵² This was mentioned as a concern by at least four Klls and was also raised in multiple regional roundtables with women's rights actors.

vote in her husband's electoral district and not in her hometown.

As in many countries, without reasonable campaign finance ceilings, elections are most accessible to those with financial means, which are largely men in Lebanon and globally.⁵³ In the 2018 elections, nomination fees were set at LBP 8 million (around \$5,300)⁵⁴ and were non-reimbursable in case of withdrawal, and the campaign finance ceiling was fixed at LBP 150 million (\$100,000), with a provision allowing candidates to spend an additional LBP 5,000 per each registered voter in the larger constituencies.⁵⁵ Because of banking secrecy laws, poor enforcement mechanisms, and loopholes whereby candidates can spend money through their networks, the ceiling is not always enforced. Women struggle to raise sufficient levels of resources to compete against their male counterparts. Women candidates have reported spending between \$3,000 and \$20,000 throughout their campaigns, with most men significantly outspending them. Female candidates also reported feeling "ashamed" to fundraise, citing that it was "unethical" of them to do so if they knew they may not win as women (UN Women 2020c).

Lack of sufficient funding for political campaigns also translates into a lack of funding for media appearances during campaigns. Although selling airtime to politicians is technically illegal, there is little enforcement, meaning airtime can cost as much as \$1,000 per minute as elections draw nearer.⁵⁶ Throughout the 2018 election cycle, female candidates received 5% of the total press coverage available

and 16% of Lebanese TV coverage during the electoral campaigning period (UN Women 2020c). While the volume of media coverage more or less reflected the proportion of female candidates, this coverage was rife with gender discrimination (Nader 2018). According to one study, 44% of candidates reported that they experienced gender discrimination from the media, with discrimination manifesting in the types of questions they were asked or the nature of the coverage they received. Female candidates were also subjected to sexual threats and discrimination. Most (78%) of the 2018 female parliamentary candidates interviewed by UN Women reported that they had been victims of some form of violence during the election period, and that the most prominent setting for such violence was social media (UN Women 2020c).

The more formalized barriers to women's participation collide with gendered social norms in a myriad of ways, some of which were mentioned above in the discussion on media coverage. Gendered social norms work to convince both women and men that women are "unsuited" for politics. Over the past decade, groups and organizations focused on enhancing women's political participation have provided hundreds of trainings under at least a dozen programmes aiming to enhance capacities for women to participate in politics, but programmes have failed to adequately tackle patriarchal norms and women's confidence levels as key barriers to women's political participation (Nassif 2020). Although the majority of men and almost all women believe there should

⁵³ There is a campaign finance ceiling in Lebanon, in Article 61 of the electoral law 44/2017, yet it is a high ceiling (Electoral Law 44, 2017). For instance, in the South the campaign finance ceiling per candidate in 2018 reached 912,620,000 LBP (Lebanese Transparency Association 2018).

⁵⁴ According to Article 45 of the 2017 electoral law.

⁵⁵ According to Article 61 of the 2017 electoral law.

⁵⁶ Selling media airtime is technically illegal, as the law clearly differentiates between free media appearances, which are supposed to be distributed equally between all lists and candidates, and advertisements. Political talk shows are legally considered media appearances and not advertisement and are therefore prohibited from being sold as per Articles 68 – 72 and 73 of the electoral law 44 (2017). However, during the 2018 elections, media outlets were selling airtime and the designated court did not take action against them.

be more women in positions of political authority,⁵⁷ women are often prevented from attaining those positions by their husbands and male relatives and due to childcare and domestic work responsibilities. Religious leaders even go so far as to actively vocalize their disapproval of women in politics (Al Shufi, 2016; Jaffal 2018).⁵⁸ Approximately a third of SSGA survey respondents reported that they did not participate in political life and decision-making at all. The main reasons they gave for not participating were a lack of understanding and a lack of interest in politics. Respondents felt they were somewhat aware of their political rights, with 53% reporting they were aware or very aware of their rights. There was a

difference between Syrians and Lebanese respondents, with 60% of Lebanese respondents reporting they were aware or very aware of their rights compared to 47% of Syrians. Physical access was highlighted as a concern for women with disabilities who may feel unsafe entering the public eye when participating in public political events, and even when going to voting stations. According to a 2009 report by the Lebanese Union for Disabled Persons (LUPD), only 1% of voting stations are accessible to those with physical disabilities (Lebanese Handicapped Union 2009).⁵⁹ The report also noted that the parliament building itself was also inaccessible, and it remains so as of 2021.

SUB-TOPIC 2: WOMEN IN UNIONS AND SYNDICATES (ELECTED AND NON-ELECTED)

A gender analysis of six syndicate/union bodies in 2018 found that while women were represented in some of the bodies, there were very few women serving in leadership positions (Hivos 2021). For example, 38% of members in the Beirut Bar Association were women, but women only occupied 17% of leadership positions in committees. Other syndicates had low representation of women, likely reflecting their lack of participation in these professions. The Order of Physicians was composed of 25% women, and only 13% of registered engineers in Lebanon were women. Women occupied only 5% of leadership positions in the engineering syndicate committees. Since they are more feminized professions, the Order of Nurses had higher female representation (62%) than men (38%), and the teacher's union was also composed of mostly women (Hivos 2021). Yet while

the overwhelming majority of teachers in Lebanon are women, not one woman was on the board of the teacher's union.

While migrant workers and refugees are unable to participate in formal Lebanese politics as voters or candidates, they are not barred from all forms of participation that would allow them to pursue equal treatment and more rights. Namely, they have formed unions. Although the right to self-organize in the form of a migrant domestic workers' union has been politically fraught in Lebanon, women migrant workers were successful in forming a union under the National Federation of Employees' and Workers' Unions in Lebanon FENASOL. They have also navigated other entry points to accelerate the migrants' rights movement by forming and being active in a variety

⁵⁷ In the 2017 IMAGES survey, 77% of men and 90% of women believed there should be more women in positions of political authority.

⁵⁸ For example, in a 2018 televised appearance, Hassan Nasrallah spoke out against women in politics, claiming they would be unable to fulfill their duties, and in 2016 Druze religious leaders issued a fatwa against women running for municipal councils. Nasrallah is quoted here while Druze religious leaders are quoted here.

⁵⁹ Arabic website available here.



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of community-based initiatives. Likewise, refugee rights violations are widespread, greatly limiting refugees' ability to

participate in public life in most forms to which they are entitled under international law (Karasapan 2021).

SUB-TOPIC 3: WOMEN IN PEACE AND SECURITY


Lebanon's National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, passed in 2017, represents the only national framework currently agreed upon in relation to peace and security. It sets out vital actions that the government, civil society, and academia have agreed to undertake to make Lebanon's peace and security deliberations more transparent and inclusive. Its pillars include, inter alia, a focus on conflict prevention, the security sector, peace-making and peacebuilding, and recovery (combating gender-based violence and supporting women's economic empowerment).

Women were at the forefront of the 2019 protests, building new political alliances, calling for reform, and working to de-escalate tensions – both through using

their bodies to prevent physical violence and in leading cross-sectarian peace actions, such as marches and small-scale negotiations during periods of escalation or violence (Wilson 2019).

This peace-making work remains vital today. Lebanon has yet to undertake any form of a reconciliation process to address its violent past. In November 2018, Law 105 on Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Lebanon was passed by the Lebanese Parliament, establishing an independent national commission that will implement the Law and investigate the fate of the missing (ICTJ 2018; Lebanese Handicapped Union n.d.). Of the 10 commissioners, four are women, in recognition of the role women have played and continue to play in the peace-making reconciliation

Figure 3. What are the main national level reform measures required in Lebanon today?



process in Lebanon.⁶⁰ Furthermore, while much has been written on Lebanon's violent past, little has been written on issues of gender and gender crimes. Forthcoming research from UN Women and Legal Action Worldwide suggests a prevalence and pattern of gendered crimes throughout Lebanon's Civil War from 1975-1990, which, like other violence, remains unaddressed and contributes to the normalization and lack of accountability for gender-based violence and violence against women today.

While global evidence shows women make positive contributions to peace and security deliberations, Lebanese female political leaders, party members as well as technocrats and activists, have had little chance in the past to show their vision and ability to develop ideas for taking the country forward and out of an impasse. There are numerous examples of women being excluded from such efforts in recent history, which makes their inclusion in the Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared all that more important. For example, women were excluded from the Ta'if Accords that brought the civil war to a halt in 1989. They

were not present in subsequent dialogues, including the 2007 efforts hosted in La Celle Saint Cloud in France and the 2008 Doha agreement. In 2010, the National Dialogue Committee, set up by then President Michel Suleiman, included 19 representatives from Lebanon's major political parties, none of whom were women. More recently, women were excluded from the Lebanese delegation to the 2020 maritime border negotiations with Israel.

Similar to matters of peace-making and peacebuilding, studies show that including women in armed forces decreases the likelihood that force will be used, yet women constitute small percentages of armed personnel worldwide, including in Lebanon (OSCE 2019). There are no comprehensive statistics available on how many women serve as part of the 128,000 active security personnel in Lebanon, but the overall percentage is thought to be minimal. Statistics are available on specific bodies, and the proportions are low. Women make up 3.6% of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and 4.7% of the General Security personnel (Hivos 2017). In 2019, women made up 5%

⁶⁰ Four members of the commission resigned on July 7, 2021.

of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and the LAF has eight female generals spread across administrative and medical units, and 17 female colonels, with a total of 57 women in its officer corps (Ghanem 2020). The LAF has also committed to the establishment of a gender unit, which is underway. In 2019, and for the first time in Lebanon's history, two female combat pilots joined the Lebanese Air Force.

Evidence points to a positive correlation between diversity and representation within national and international security apparatuses, levels of community trust, and the effectiveness of efforts to prevent violent extremism (OSCE 2019). Notably, increasing women's representation in security institutions through advocacy, awareness-raising, and removal of gendered obstacles is part of Strategic Objective 1 of Lebanon's NAP on Women, Peace, and Security. Article Two of Resolution 839/MD (passed on 15/10/1991) set the threshold for women's participation across the Ministry of Defense uniformed personnel at 10%, and the NAP WPS committed to a 5% increase of uniformed

female personnel across Lebanon's security apparatus (Official Website of the Lebanese Army 2021).

In light of the deep, complex, crises, in part fueled by the prevailing patriarchal and exclusionary political and economic norms in Lebanon, new and diverse voices who can bring independent and creative ideas for recovery have never been more needed. Women surveyed for the SSGA stated that formation of a government (29%), management of inflation and the economic crisis (28%), and ending the COVID-19 pandemic (10%) were their top three demands – all issues that must be approached with the needs of women in mind and with their meaningful involvement. Stakeholders emphasized that as new political actors emerge in Lebanon, these groups must be encouraged to align their work with feminist demands and take measures to ensure that women's voices are sufficiently heard.⁶¹ Stakeholders noted that emerging political actors and activists should not replicate historical patriarchal practices as they seek to address Lebanon's political and economic crises.

⁶¹ This subject was discussed in the feminist charter roundtable on 28 May, with one speaker saying, "We need to ensure that within these emerging political groups we have proper gender representation and that gender is mainstreamed within them." A KII respondent said, "Progressive groups in the thawra are still patriarchal. I'm turning 40 this year; these boys can't keep talking to me like this." Another activist interviewed by an INGO based in Lebanon remarked "with the revolution, the testosterone went up, and the boys could not control their patriarchal tendencies." The same female activist described how, before the revolution, there were practical steps in place to ensure an equitable space for women within the group – including monitoring the amount of time that men and women spoke in meetings – but this was halted for a while as events quickly unfolded and systems once in place were relegated.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INVESTMENT IN, AND SUPPORT TO, GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN LEBANON



FREEDOM FROM ALL FORMS OF GBV FOR ALL WOMEN, MEN, GIRLS AND BOYS

In order to advocate for a legal environment that promotes gender equality, addresses the social norms underpinning GBV in Lebanon, and ensures sufficient service provision to survivors, the following actions are recommended.

SUPPORTING KEY LEGISLATIVE REFORM MEASURES THAT ARE CRITICAL FOR ADDRESSING GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

- **Adopt:** unified civil personal status law; domestic workers' law; law to mandate 18 years as the minimum marriage age;
- **Repeal:** Article 534 of the Penal Code which is used to criminalize same-sex relations and certain gender identities and expressions; Article 521 of the penal code, which is on women impersonating women and entering women only spaces, is used to criminalize trans women; Decree No. 15 of 1925 on Lebanese nationality, and adopt legislation to ensure women have the same right as men to pass on their nationality to their foreign spouses and children.
- **Amend:** Articles 503 and 504 of the penal code; ; or otherwise; Law 164 on anti-trafficking to align with the UN protocol on anti-trafficking to maximize protections for victims; a definition of sexual violence to domestic violence law 293 and sexual harassment law 205 as defined in criminal law as rape or attempt to rape and harassment.

ADDRESSING PATRIARCHAL SOCIAL NORMS AS ROOT CAUSES OF GBV

- **Work** to transform patriarchal social and cultural norms and behaviour to achieve gender equality and equal opportunity for those with marginalized gender identities, roles, and expression, as well as address toxic masculinity and utilize feminist approaches to engage men and boys to prevent and respond to GBV; and to reduce the prevalence of intersecting racist, homophobic, and ableist attitudes. Entry points for interventions include:
 - Targeting the education system to integrate education on gender norms and gender stereotypes into the national curricula.
 - Influencing community, political, and religious leaders.
 - Utilizing cultural resources: arts, multimedia, and social media.
- Mainstream gender transformative social norms interventions in all sectors of work to tackle the root causes of gender inequality.
- Increase the gender equality awareness of the justice sector, including judges in religious courts, to promote gender-equitable attitudes and decrease gender discrimination for GBV survivors seeking legal redress. Address issues of gender and judicial bias through engagement with judges, prosecutors, and justice officials.

SUSTAINABLE AND LONG-TERM SUPPORT FOR GBV SERVICE PROVISION

- Link the provision of GBV response service to interventions aimed at preventing GBV through enhancing women's choices and freedoms. This includes linking GBV response work to interventions targeting economic empowerment and leadership.
- Scale-up multi-sectoral services for GBV, including mental health and psychosocial support, legal aid, protection, and health, such as clinical management of rape, with a focus in rural and underserved areas, including Akkar, the South, and Bekaa. Include communication support for SGBV survivors through additional phone credits, internet bundles, and mobile phones, if needed, to allow them access to remote case management and other prevention activities.
- Provide long term and sustainable support to emergency response spaces, including shelters for victims of gender-based violence and trafficking. Linked to this, provide long term funding for legal aid services, recognizing that seeking accountability for gender-based violence can be a lengthy process.
- Increase the capacity of GBV service providers to respond to the needs of specific marginalized groups at risk of GBV, including persons with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons, migrant domestic workers, and older women.

Invest in building the Institutional Capacity of Government Institutions on GBV Response, Including by:

- Supporting the capacity of Social Development Centres and the Ministry of Social Affairs to effectively prevent and respond to GBV. This includes endorsing a unified SDC model that includes basic GBV prevention and response services, such as skilled social workers. Support MOSA in operationalizing and implementing the GBV National SOPs, a national referral pathway and an inter-ministerial mechanism that brings together all relevant national bodies, including the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Interior and the security services, the National Commission for Lebanese Women, and others to address GBV.⁶²
- Strengthening institutional mechanisms by implementing the National Action Plan for the Protection of Women and Girls,⁶³ and the National Strategy to Institutionalize Clinical Management of Rape (CMR), and Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) Programming.
- Introducing a system of state-funded legal aid accessible to Lebanese and non-Lebanese women.
- Scaling up governmental measures to respond to sex trafficking.

⁶² FMI, see: <https://www.abaadmena.org/documents/ebook.1491983561.pdf>

⁶³ FMI, see: <https://www.unicef.org/lebanon/press-releases/ministry-social-affairs-launched-partnership-unicef-its-2020-2027-strategic-plan>

- Supporting the capacity of the national judicial apparatus, in its civil and religious courts, to improve access to justice for GBV survivors,⁶⁴ specifically by:
 - Adopting more flexible rules of evidence that would better enable survivors of violence to hold their perpetrators accountable.
 - Recognizing domestic violence as a key consideration when ruling on family law matters (including divorce, alimony, and/or damages) and protecting survivors by granting divorce or separation.
 - Creating capacity-building programmes for religious judges to enhance their legal understanding and legal skills beyond the application of religious laws.
 - Ensuring that the 48-hour timeframe imposed by Law 293 for survivors' protection is enforced.
 - Increasing the digitization capacity of the judiciary infrastructure and its ability to function remotely/online for efficiency.
 - Considering judgments issued by other Lebanese courts in domestic violence cases as irrefutable evidence of violence.
- Establishing a governmental system to monitor and address sexual exploitation and abuse with regards to access to services, including abuses by government personnel and aid workers across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus.

⁶⁴ These recommendations echo targeted recommendations put forth in the following study by Expertise France: "Enhancing Access to Justice for Survivors of Domestic Violence Before Lebanese Courts. A Practical Courts, 2021."

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

In order to advance long-term macro-level policies that favour women, increase women's labour force participation, and address the underlying causes of women's low labour force participation such as social norms, lack of childcare options, unfavourable business environments, and access to reproductive healthcare, the below should be considered.

ADVOCATE FOR GENDER-RESPONSIVE MACROECONOMIC REFORMS AND ENSURE ALL RECOVERY EFFORTS CONSIDER AND ADDRESS ISSUES OF GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

INCREASING FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORTING A

- Economic stabilization remains central to maintaining women's rights in Lebanon. Continue support for reforms that will enable a path toward economic and financial recovery. Provide support to actors developing gender-responsive recovery plans and advocate for their inclusion in broader reform and recovery efforts.
- Support efforts to revise labour and social security laws to address gender discrimination, specifically:
 - Include national and foreign domestic workers in the Labour Code, Article 7, in order to dismantle the Kafala system.
 - Amend Article 24 of Law 46/12017 on flexible work in an effort to increase paid maternity leave to a minimum of 14 weeks and pass legislative amendments to protect paternity leave.
 - Repeal Article 26 of the Labour Law, which prohibits women from working in certain occupations considered arduous or hazardous.
 - Repeal Article 14 of the Labour Law, which guarantees insurance coverage for a non-employed wife of a contributing husband but only allows a contributing wife insurance coverage for her husband if he is over 60 or disabled.

GENDER-RESPONSIVE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

- Ensure that all cash assistance support and scale up efforts target men and women equally based on vulnerability and need. Ensure that all cash assistance is tagged with strong PSEA systems and monitoring is undertaken to ascertain the gendered impact of cash assistance. Where there are negative impacts, if cash assistance reinforces regressive gender norms (male control over decision making), amend delivery pathways as needed.

- Support the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) to address areas of gender inequality in order to address the needs of severely socio-economically marginalized women. This includes supporting linkages between job creation programmes and women receiving assistance under the NPTP to lift women out of poverty.
- Take effective measures to eliminate illiteracy amongst girls and women, improve access of non-Lebanese people of all ages to affordable and quality education, and encourage girls to study science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Offer high quality technical skills building trainings (nationally or internationally certified where possible) to cohorts of women who are interested in joining the workforce, and link trainings to opportunities to enter the economy, such as paid apprenticeships or cash for work placements.
- Support actors' efforts to attract women into new areas of the economy with high growth and job creation potential, including providing incentives to businesses to recruit, retain, and train women and to provide safe and accessible work environments.
- Support women-led small and medium enterprises in expanding into domestic production of essential items and services (as they are more likely to be gender equitable and hire women), increasing their control over finances, capital, and assets, and accessing national and international procurement supply chains.
- Support the private sector to develop and improve access to appropriate financing for women owned or led businesses which export goods and support the Government of Lebanon and Banque du Liban to improve policies and regulations related to women entrepreneurs' access to finance and financial services.
- Support the public and private sectors to invest in a stronger care economy to enhance women's work force participation, both by increasing job opportunities in the social care sectors, and by facilitating more women in other jobs. Develop targeted interventions that support mothers returning to the workforce following maternity leave and support at-home childcare needs.
- Protect female workers in the informal economy by:
 - Supporting women-led enterprises to access formal business registration.
 - Increasing women's access to financial services (bank accounts, loans, credit).
 - Leveraging women's access to social protection.⁶⁵
 - Investing in quality education for female youth and adult women, including literacy programmes and technical skill programmes.⁶⁶
 - Including protections for agricultural workers in the Labour Law, given the high percentage of informal female workers in the agricultural sector.
- Support incentives to include and advance more women in leadership positions in the private sector. Interventions could include:
 - Establishing sector-specific women's leadership and mentorship programmes.
 - Creating a pool of qualified women who receive the Board of Directors Certification and Women on Boards of Certification.
- Prioritize partnerships with private sector partners that demonstrate gender equality; support other businesses to become more gender equitable by:⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Including aforementioned reforms in the above section on advancing gender-responsive macro-economic reforms.

⁶⁶ Evidence suggests that education also helps to improve workers' earnings: wages tend to increase by 10% for every additional year of primary school, 15–25% for each additional year of secondary school, and nearly 17% for tertiary education (Hunt and Samman, 2016).

⁶⁷ FMI, see: <https://www.weeps.org/resources>.

- Supporting their implementation of the 2020 sexual harassment law.
 - Developing gender non-discrimination policies and practices in the workplace.
 - Increasing their inclusion of female-led businesses in supply chains.
 - Establishing high-level corporate leadership for gender equality.
- Ensure economic and livelihoods assistance interventions are designed and implemented with protection interventions, including specific targeting for GBV survivors, and include GBV referral pathways.
- Gather more comprehensive data on diverse women and gender minorities in different sectors of the work force, with specific focus on minority groups, including women and girls with disabilities, women migrant domestic workers, LGBTIQ+ groups with a focus on LBQT women and gender non-conforming individuals. This includes:
 - Supporting the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) to conduct a new Labour Force and Living Conditions Survey to fully capture the ways in which the economic crisis has impacted different groups, including diverse women.
 - Advocate for reduced legal barriers and more flexible procedures for refugees to obtain work permits and/or residencies, within a protracted refugee context.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTLY FROM WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY ACTORS IN LEBANON

The following recommendations were routinely echoed by the 108 women's rights and gender equality advocates consulted from diverse institutions and thematic areas of work. These cross-cutting actions include:

- Increase the localization of funding in Lebanon's response plans, with a focus on national women's rights and gender equality organizations, women-led organizations, and national organizations working on behalf of migrant, refugee, stateless, disabled, older, and LGBTIQ+ groups, specifically LBQT women and gender non-conforming individuals.
- Increase opportunities for multi-year funding and longer project timelines to increase impact on gender equality issues; and work towards flexible funding opportunities for small actors, especially emerging women's rights and LGBTIQ+ actors.
- Support efforts to ensure accountability for the Beirut port explosions by lobbying for an impartial investigation, which seeks to determine the cause and perpetrators of the events and assesses women's rights violations arising from it.
- Advocate for trade arrangements and funding deals to include clauses and commitments to gender equality issues.
- Continue leveraging political influence to ensure reforms aimed at improved, just and inclusive governance in Lebanon, as political reform remains a cornerstone of protecting and advancing women's rights.

ENSURE ACCESS TO SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORTING A GENDER-RESPONSIVE BUSINESS ENVIR

- Support the development of locally produced menstrual pads and women's hygiene materials for socioeconomically marginalized women and girls of reproductive age, particularly in rural and underserved areas, to address the issue of period poverty.
- Supporting access to maternal health services, including for non-Lebanese women (refugee and migrant domestic workers) whose maternal mortality rate is at least four times higher than Lebanese women's rate.
- Sustaining access to sexually transmitted infection testing and complimentary sexual health services, which remain absent from the state's services and are not covered in any insurance schemes.
- Support women's rights actors to advocate for access to safe and legal abortions, in addition to removing all legal restrictions to providing information on safe abortions and post-abortion care and decriminalizing healthcare providers and women seeking abortions.

WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE, INCLUDING MATTERS OF PEACE AND SECURITY

In order to enhance women's leadership and participation in all levels of politics within institutions, political bodies, and communities, the below actions ⁶⁸ should be considered. Most of the recommendations are proposed to be addressed in both the long-term and very short-term, given the upcoming 2022 parliamentary elections and the opportunity for political reform and change.

PROMOTING WOMEN IN ELECTED AND EXECUTIVE-LEVEL POSITIONS

- Support efforts to lobby for the revision of the 2017 Electoral Law to increase the participation and protection of women in elections, as per the following:
 - Introduce a female quota for Parliament and for elected local positions.
 - Amend articles to lower the candidacy registration fee and address issues of campaign financing
 - Amend discriminatory articles in the law (e.g., that women, once married, must vote in their husbands' place of origin.)
 - Establish an independent election management body in which women represent at least 50% of the members.
 - Adopt a law protecting women from political violence, including any act which is intended to deprive or prevent women from participating in political, partisan, or association activities.
- Lobby political parties to change their party bylaws and enact a 50% female quota for their internal structures; encourage political parties to announce their adoption of the quota in their upcoming lists for the 2022 elections and for forthcoming elections.
- Support the provision of political education and leadership training for women and develop clear strategies to promote their participation in leadership positions.
- Support election monitoring by independent national and international actors that monitor and report on issues of gender equality, including election access for persons with disabilities, during the 2022 election and forthcoming elections.
- Support efforts to ensure that national media reporting on the 2022 and forthcoming elections covers women's rights issues, allows female candidates equal access to airtime, and avoids negative gender stereotypes. Specific actions for these aims include:
 - Advocating for the Supervisory Commission for Elections to impose a limit on the number of paid spaces allocated for advertising and election propaganda to then allow women and men candidates more opportunities to appear in free media coverage of the election.
 - Encouraging broadcast debates between men and women candidates without requiring financial compensation from candidates.
 - Lobbying for women to represent political parties in the media.

⁶⁸ The targeted recommendations in this area draw heavily from recommendations put forth in a forthcoming report by the Lebanese non-governmental organization, LADE: "A Gender Analysis of the 2017 Electoral Law."

- Raise awareness amongst Parliamentarians (female and male) on the benefit of the adoption of key laws, legislations, and decrees to prevent discrimination against women and to support their participation and protection in political, economic, and social life.
- Provide technical assistance to senior officials and gender focal points in line ministries to build their capacity for gender mainstreaming in public sector strategy, policy, and budgets.

PROMOTING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP IN UNIONS AND SYNDICATES

- Support efforts to leverage female members' candidacies for syndicates and union council positions, especially for high-level posts. This particularly applies to bodies which represent sectors where women make up a significant portion of the workforce, such as nursing, social work, and education.
- Encourage the adoption of internal policies for unions and syndicates which outline protections for women against all forms of gender discrimination, gender-based violence, and sexual harassment, and explicitly ensure women's opportunities for internal progression within unions are not hindered by them taking maternity leave.
- Enable opportunities for increased collaboration between syndicates, unions, political parties, and national women's rights organizations to raise awareness amongst actors on issues related to gender equality and women's participation.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP IN PEACE AND SECURITY SECTORS

- Encourage relevant national and international stakeholders to work towards the implementation of commitments endorsed within Lebanon's National Action Plan for Resolution 1325, as related to peace and security (UN Women and National Commission for Lebanese Women 2019).
- Enable women's leadership and equal representation in decision-making bodies within coordination structures across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, so women can act as watchdogs on gender equality and women's rights issues. This includes within the Relief, Reconstruction, and Reform (3RF) Framework, the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan, and all forthcoming emergency response plans.
- Advocate for women from different backgrounds to be meaningfully included in all peace and stability dialogues and negotiations in and about Lebanon, both political and technical.
- Support the work of local female peacebuilders across all eight governorates. This should include supporting the work of women peacebuilders on accountability and reconciliation in order to address Lebanon's legacy of violence, corruption, and impunity.

- Strengthen the capacity and knowledge of security sector personnel with regards to SGBV and PSEA, including both men and women and those at all levels of leadership.
- Support efforts to increase women's participation in the security force to 5%, as committed to in Lebanon's NAP on Resolution 1325.
- Advocate for the recruitment of women municipal police officers in communities and support them in mitigating conflict, decreasing tensions, and fostering greater trust between law enforcement and communities; support the expansion of female and male police units to respond to domestic violence and other types of sexual and gender-based violence.
- Support the emerging Gender Unit within the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as integrate gender equality into the bylaws in order to establish systems and processes to effectively address issues of gender equality, SGBV, and PSEA.
- Ensure all support to Lebanon is conflict sensitive and build gender analysis into conflict analyses that are undertaken and supported.



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ANNEXES



ANNEX 1

FULL SSGA METHODOLOGY

This annex provides an in-depth description of the SSGA methodology as per each phase of the research.

I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical framework for this analysis was based on 1) the GAP III sectors and 2) the results of the Country Gender Profile. First, a gaps analysis was undertaken on the Country Gender Profile for each GAP III sector. Main illustrative findings and sub-topics from the Profile under each GAP III sector were summarized in an interview tool that helped guide the consultations. In interviews and roundtables, each of these lines of inquiry were applied per each GAP III sector and sub-topic:

1. **Context:** What are the key context-specific features of gender relations across the EU GAP III priority areas?
2. **Crises:** What has been the gendered impact of the COVID-19, economic, and Beirut Port Explosion crises?
3. **Identities:** How do differences in gender roles, activities, needs, and interests

of women in each of the proposed priority sectors differ for women of diverse legal status (refugees, migrants), nationalities, ages (adolescent girls and older women), sexual orientation (LGBT women specifically, from the wider LGBTIQ+ populations), gender identity and expression (non-binary persons), localities, disability status (disabled women), and socioeconomic status?

4. **Barriers:** What social, legal, religious, political, economic, and cultural barriers exist to achievement of gender equality across the GAP III priority areas and for women of diverse backgrounds?
5. **Institutions and Policy:** Which institutions and policies per each thematic area hinder or promote/support gender equality in Lebanon?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

UN Women conducted an extensive review of literature for the SSGA. The literature review built on the findings of and identified gender knowledge gaps from the UN Women-World Bank-NCLW 2020 Gender Profile of Lebanon. The review also helped prioritize the sectors. Additional secondary literature included publications by think tanks, academia, the UN, civil society, and the government of Lebanon, and the review prioritized the recent literature published after 2018 (after the release of the last EU Gender Situational Analysis Report).

In addition, available statistical data from sources such as the 2020 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, the World Bank, and the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) was used to develop a Gender Statistical Profile. Results of the literature review informed question guides and questionnaires for primary data collection and were integrated with primary data in the main report. The review was also guided by key documents provided by the EU, namely the GAP III agenda and action

plan, the evaluation of GAP II, the EU strategy on LGBTIQ+ equality, and the gender profile and analysis completed for Lebanon in 2015 and 2018 respectively. Findings from the literature review informed the selection of three primary focus sectors for analysis from the six priority areas outlined in the EU GAP III.

2.2 STAKEHOLDER MAPPING

As part of the literature review process, UN Women mapped stakeholders involved

in service provision and advocacy under each target area, based off of the Gender Working Group⁶⁹ 2020 gender actor mapping, with additional updates from UN Women's existing network and mapping of organizations working on women's issues. The stakeholder mapping also included analysis of EU member states' commitments to gender equality. The national and international strategies, plans, and frameworks for Lebanon reviewed are shown in Table 1.

⁶⁹ The Gender Working Group is a UN Women-led forum for all UN agencies' gender focal points to coordinate, advocate, and promote gender equality in Lebanon.

TABLE 1. STRATEGIES

- National Strategy for Women in Lebanon
- National Strategy for Older Persons in Lebanon
- Qudwa: A National Strategy to Improve the Life of Girls, Boys, and Women
- National Strategy to Institutionalize Clinical Management of Rape (CMR) and Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) Programming

PLANS

- The Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), with a specific focus on Social Cohesion, Inclusion and Gender
- Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, with specific focus on food security, protection, and health
- National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
- National Action Plan on Women's Economic Empowerment
- National Action Plan for the Protection of Women and Girls
- Strategic Plan for the Protection of Women and Children

INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

- CEDAW 2020: submission to the 79 Pre-Sessional Working Group of the CEDAW Committee on the implementation of the CEDAW by Lebanon.
- Universal Periodic Review 2020: national report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 (with specific attention to sections on women and LGBTIQ+ issues in Lebanon).

III. CONSULTATIONS

Building on the findings of the literature review, UN Women consulted with EU member states and prominent feminist civil society actors (via online consultations) in order to finalize the selection of priority sectors. These activities are further elaborated as follows:

3.1 EU MEMBER STATE CONSULTATIONS (2)

UN Women organized two roundtables with EU member states. The first such consultation was to introduce the Specific Sector Gender Analysis, identify thematic areas on gender equality, and finalize the determination of the selected priority areas on which the EU Delegation will work over the coming five years. This roundtable was organized immediately at the inception period to inform the strategic approach of the wider consultation process and final (SSGA) report and to generate buy-in amongst EU member states. It occurred on 10 May and included six EU member state representatives.

The second such roundtable occurred at the end of the analytical period (18 June 2021) and provided EU stakeholders the opportunity to validate and discuss the findings and recommendations of the SSGA. Six (6) EU members attended the introductory roundtable and four (4) joined the validation workshop.

3.2 ROUNDTABLES WITH REGIONAL, UN AND THEMATIC FEMINIST CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (7)

In consultation with the EU and its member states and based on the results of the literature review per each thematic areas of the analytical framework, UN Women identified individual

grassroots-level stakeholders such as: 1) leaders of organizations working on gender equality and women's rights, 2) analysts who provide commentary and/or input on policy development, and 3) feminist community organizers across each thematic area. Four of the roundtables were with stakeholders from the different regions (Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, Northern Lebanon, South Lebanon), one was with stakeholders from the feminist civil society platform, one was with emerging youth activists, and one was with UN gender actors. Roundtable participants provided their input on priority sectors of focus and discussed specific questions to guide the discussion around each sector area. These roundtables occurred throughout May 2021 and engaged 59 people (three men and 56 women).

3.3 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (31 INTERVIEWS WITH 38 PEOPLE)

Following the literature review and the initial round of consultations, UN Women undertook targeted key informant interviews. UN Women developed thematic question guides across the selected sectors. 31 key informant interviews, with 38 experts across the thematic sectors were conducted. The majority of these stakeholders were: 1) leaders of local grassroots organizations that provide direct services to women, 2) local analysts who provide commentary and/or inputs on policy development, or 3) think tanks/universities/feminist activists and community organizers across each thematic area, including new emerging youth groups. Informants were identified in consultation with the EU as well as in consultation with the actors consulted in the initial consultations.

IV. SSGA SURVEY

The SSGA survey was carried out in partnership with the research firm Triangle. This research

component aimed to contextualize preliminary consultation findings, investigate new vulnerability

profiles in Lebanon, and interrogate how to approach women's economic and political empowerment as concepts. Mixing power analysis and an intersectional approach, the survey looked at women's personal status, age group, income level, educational background, disability status, employment status (and sector of work), and at Lebanon's ongoing economic crisis to probe further into specific barriers to women's economic and political empowerment in the current context. It also built-in assessment of four key sectors identified by the EU as potential focus areas for its economic assistance programme: Agriculture, Industry, the Knowledge Economy, and Tourism.

The survey was structured around the following research questions:

1. What are the main features of the employment situation for women in Lebanon?
 - a. What social and economic factors contribute to women's decisions around whether to pursue paid employment?
 - b. What challenges do employed women face in the workplace (both work/economic activity inside the home and outside)?
 - c. How does the availability and affordability of childcare factor into a woman's decision to seek work in the paid economy?
 - d. What are the main contributing factors to women's decisions around whether to 1) leave or 2) never join the workforce?
2. To what extent do traditional humanitarian and development livelihoods projects contribute to sustainable employment options for women?
 - a. What value (economic or otherwise), if any, do these programmes have in communities of implementation?
 - b. What level of interest do women have in work in the priority sectors (agriculture, industry, the knowledge economy, and tourism) selected by the EU?

3. What are the main demands women have in terms of national political action?

4.1 SURVEY SAMPLE

The sampling frame of the Survey on Economic Empowerment Factors (SEEF) consisted of female Syrian refugees and Lebanese women who were either employed, unemployed, or non-participants in the labour force. These sampling categories were classified according to the ILO definitions of employment, unemployment, and labour force activity. Quota sampling was employed to target a total of 1000 women through phone banking, according to Table 1. All respondents had achieved the age of majority (18).

Sampling Strategy

As per the sampling frame, the survey aimed to assess a nationally representative sample, which assumed a population size of 3,400,00 women, divided across Lebanese and Syrian nationalities, residing in Lebanon.⁷⁰ Accordingly, the SEEF set out a purposive sampling strategy with a 99% confidence level and a 4.08% confidence interval at the country level.⁷¹ Quotas across governorates and nationalities were then distributed accordingly to achieve targeted quotas to produce the spatial sampling of the survey per Table 1. During the course of the survey, enumerators overshoot certain quotas, resulting in 22% more women being surveyed (as per Table 2). Accordingly, the survey achieved a 99% confidence level and a 3.68% confidence interval at the country level.

⁷⁰ See UNFPA Dashboard at <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/LB#>

⁷¹ Estimated as per OCHA Lebanon Governorate Profiles.

TABLE 2: SEEF SAMPLING TARGETS & ACHIEVEMENTS

	Lebanese Citizen	Lebanese Citizen	Lebanese Citizen	Lebanese Citizen	Syrian Refugees	Syrian Refugees	Syrian Refugees	Syrian Refugees
Governorate/ Area	% Targeted	% Achieved	Sample Targeted	Sample Achieved	% Targeted	% Achieved	Sample Targeted	Sample Achieved
Bekaa	24.50%	22.92%	123	154	38.60%	35.13%	192	196
North Lebanon	19.40%	20.39%	97	137	26.60%	25.09%	132	140
Beirut & Mount Lebanon	37.80%	40.63%	189	273	24.20%	22.04%	120	123
South Lebanon	18.30%	16.07%	91	108	11.20%	17.74%	56	99
TOTAL	100%	100%	500	672	100%	100%	500	558

Field overview, complications, adaptations and mitigation measures

Survey operations took place between 26 May 2021 and June 2021. During this period, a total of 24 surveyors drew from existing databases, which are composed of people who have and people who have not been a part of previous programming. This approach was adopted in order to minimize any health risks arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, even if the approach introduced some sampling bias in favour of women who have access to phones. Surveyors were provided with anonymised lists of respondents selected using a randomised number generator. Completed surveys were tracked against quotas, then checked for consistency and red flags (e.g., completion time, illogical answers, etc.).

However, during the research, connectivity issues, aforementioned considerations around bias, and a relatively favourable public health environment (re: COVID-19) lead to the decision to engage women in-person. In total, 496 in-person surveys were conducted. Surveyors combined a mixture of home visits

and site visits at NGOs of research subjects in local communities (Lebanese), as well as ITS and non-ITS visits (Syrian refugees) in the governorates where connectivity issues were highest, namely in Bekaa (Arsal and Saadnayel, Hermel, Jebjenine, and other villages in west and central Bekaa), South Lebanon (Nabatiyeh and Saida), and Mount Lebanon (Chouf). Surveyors were instructed to monitor and select varying profiles in relation to age, education level, shelter type, and rural/peri-urban/urban areas.

Analysis

Starting during field deployment, quantitative data was cleaned and processed using research and data processing software (e.g. SPSS 25.0). Triangle will run cross-tabulations across socio-demographic information to form tables that allow for comparing percentages, providing the basis for clear visual data representation. Disaggregation criteria was agreed upon in advance with UNW in the form of an analysis plan, which allowed for data to be analyzed once final surveys were conducted.

ANNEX 2

PROFILE OF THE SSGA SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Figure 1.
SSGA RESPONDENTS BY NATIONALITY
AND GOVERNORATE




Figure 2.
SSGA RESPONDENTS WHO ARE HEADS
OF HOUSEHOLD




Figure 3.
SSGA RESPONDENTS BY MARITAL STATUS AND AGE




Figure 4.
SSGA RESPONDENTS BY AGE AND DISABILITY STATUS





Figure 5.
SSGA RESPONDENTS CURRENTLY WORKING



ANNEX 3

SSGA KEY FINDINGS

Figure 6.
DID WORKING IMPROVE OR IMPAIR YOUR LIFE OR BOTH?




Figure 7.
WHY HAVE YOU NEVER CONSIDERED GETTING A JOB?





Figure 8.
WHY DID HAVING CHILDREN FACTOR INTO YOUR ABILITY TO WORK?



ANNEX 4

CONSULTATIONS

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

ORGANIZATION / AFFILIATION	TYPE OF ENTITY
Marsa	NGO
AUB	University
Human Rights Watch	International Organization
Activist	Civil Society
HELEM	NGO
AUB	University
LiHaqqi	Political Party
Institute of Finance	Director
ABAAD	NGO
AFE/independent	NGO
KAFA	NGO
Activist /specialist	Civil Society
LADE	NGO
Fifty Fifty	NGO
CPM-USJ	University
AUB/CIBL	University
Haltek	NGO
SEEDS	NGO
ARM	NGO
Crypta Lebanon	Private Sector
former RDFL	Civil Society
Activist (former RDFL)	Civil Society
World Bank	International Organization
World Bank	International Organization
World Bank	International Organization
Deloitte (former NCLW)	Private Sector
SIDA	EU Members State
SIDA	EU Members State
Netherlands	EU Members State
Lebanese Parliament	Government of Lebanon
Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE)	Government of Lebanon
Justice Without Frontiers	Government of Lebanon

TYPE AND DATE	LOCATION	AFFILIATION
Regional May 26 (6)	Bekaa	Programs officer
	Bekaa	Representative
	Bekaa	Founder/Director
	Bekaa	Bekaa center manager
	Bekaa	Central and West Bekaa Coordinator
Regional May 27 (9)	Mount Lebanon	Adyan
	Mount Lebanon	RDFL
	Mount Lebanon	Beity Association
	Mount Lebanon	Madaniyat
	Mount Lebanon	LiHaqqi
Regional May 27 (9)	North Lebanon	Renee Moawad Foundation
	North Lebanon	Val de Fii
	North Lebanon	Lebanese Council to Resist VAW
	North Lebanon	Tripoli Bar Association
	North Lebanon	Safadi Foundation
	North Lebanon	Tripoli Bar Association
	North Lebanon	Akkar Network for Development
	North Lebanon	RDFL
	North Lebanon	RDFL
Regional May 26 (10)	South	Al Najdeh Association
	South	Lebanese League for Women in Business - LLWB
	South	UNIFIL
	South	SDC of Bint Jbeil and branches
	South	Women's Affairs Sector/Amal Movement
	South	RDFL
	South	Lebanese League for Women in Business - LLWB
	South	UN Women's south mediation network
	South	SDC Of Ayta Ash Sha'b and branches
	South	ABAAD
Feminist Charter Members May 28 (7)	Beirut	LAU/Institute of Women
	Beirut	LLWB
	Beirut	Daraj
	Beirut	Women From Lebanon
	Beirut	SIDC
	Beirut	Female
	Beirut	JWF

TYPE AND DATE	LOCATION	AFFILIATION
Youth (Beirut) May 28 (6)	Beirut	Takaddoum
	Beirut	Activist
	Beirut	Interact Koura
	Beirut	DRI
	Beirut	Student at LAU
	Beirut	Together We Rebuild
EU Member States (6) May 10	Beirut	Finland
	Beirut	Italy
	Beirut	Netherlands
	Beirut	Sweden
	Beirut	Spain
	Beirut	France
EU Members States June 18 (4)	Beirut	France
	Beirut	Finland
	Beirut	Sweden
	Beirut	Spain
UN Agencies in Lebanon May 20 (17)	Beirut	WHO
	Beirut	ILO
	Beirut	WFP
	Beirut	UNICEF
	Beirut	UNFPA
	Beirut	OHCHR
	Beirut	UNHCR
	Beirut	UN Habitat
	Beirut	UNSCOL
	Beirut	UNIFIL
	Beirut	UNIFIL
	Beirut	UNIFIL
	Beirut	UNIFIL
	Beirut	UNESCO
	Beirut	UNICEF
	Beirut	FAO
	Beirut	IOM

ANNEX 5

LEBANON GENDER STATISTICAL PROFILE

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Overall Gender Gap - rank		132/156		World Economic Forum	2021
Overall Gender Gap - score		0.638		World Economic Forum	2021
Overall Gender Gap - rank		145/153		World Economic Forum	2020
Overall Gender Gap - score		0.599		World Economic Forum	2020
BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS					
Overall population sex ratio (male/female)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	100 females	93.70 males	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
	Lebanese	100 females	94 males	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
	Palestinian	100 females	98 males	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
	Syrian	100 females	100 males	VASyR	2020
Disabilities (physical and mental)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	3.90 females	4.10 males	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
Disabilities related to hearing (of those who are disabled)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	18.80%	20.90%	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
Disabilities related to communication (of those who are disabled)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	11.10%	17.90%	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
Disabilities related to walking (of those who are disabled)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	65.20%	51.40%	UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
SECTOR 1: GENDER BASED VIOLENCE					
OVERALL					
Average rates of domestic violence	Lebanese	1 in 2 persons know someone subjected to domestic violence		UNFPA	2017
Average rates of domestic violence amongst married women	Lebanese	31% of ever married women report to have ever experienced at least one form of IPV		IMAGES/ UN Women	2018
Percentage of victims who reported to seek help at the onset of the pandemic	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	24%		UN Women and UNFPA	2021
Specific information on women and girls with disabilities reporting GBV		No Data			
Specific information on LGBTQ+ individuals reporting GBV		No Data			
SUB-SECTOR 1: GENDER AND LEGAL INEQUITIES					
<i>(no quantitative data to report)</i>					
SUB-SECTOR 2: PATRIARCHAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL NORMS					
Perceive wife beating as justifiable	Lebanese and Syrian	5.30%	20.90%	IMAGES/ UN Women	2018
Report experiencing (female) or perpetrating (male) marital rape in their lifetime	Lebanese and Syrian	15 % of women reported being raped by their husbands	7% of men reported forcing their wives to have sex.	IMAGES/ UN Women	2018
Percent of women survivors reporting why they do not access justice due specific factors	Syrian	65% due to fearing the consequences; 52% due to stigma and shame; and 48% because they believe that nothing will change		UN Women	Forthcoming a
Percentage of women who report that, out of the women they know who have experienced violence, the percentage who actually sought help	Lebanese and Syrian	24%		UN Women and UNFPA	2021

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Child marriage percentage (defined as women and girls aged 20 to 24 years married before the age of 18)	Lebanese	6%		UNICEF	2015-2016
	Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (PRL)	12%		UNICEF	2015-2016
	Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS)	26%	3%	VASyR	2020
Percentage of women and men who agree with the law to arrest and imprison people who engage in homosexual acts	Lebanese and Syrian	37%	68%	IMAGES/ UN Women	2018
SUB-SECTOR 3: UNDERRESOURCED AND LIMITED SERVICE PROVISION					
Number of GBV hotlines run by international and national NGO's		> 70 (non-unique hotlines)		SGBV TF Lebanon Hotline Leaflet	2020
SECTOR II: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS					
SUB-SECTOR 1: MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY					
Syrians having legal residency in Lebanon	Syrians	18%	23%	VASyR	2020
Percentage of female headed families benefitting from the NPTP	Lebanese	13%		MOSA (internal data)	2019
SUB-SECTOR 2: FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION - GENDER ANALYSIS OF CAS DATA FROM 2018-2019					
Labor force participation rate (nationally)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	25%	76%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	forthcoming
Labor force participation rate (nationally)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	29.30%	70.40%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation rate of women with disability (nationally)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	5.50%	24%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation rate - Beirut	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	36.80%	71.40%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation rate - ML	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	35%	72.40%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation rate - Akkar	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	15%	61.80%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation rate - Nabatieh	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	20.70%	68.10%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Labor force participation rate - Bekaa	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	22.70%	71%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Labor force participation (nationally)	Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS)	14%	66%	UNRWA	2016
Labor force participation (nationally)	Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (PRL)	17%	69%	UNRWA	2016
Labor force participation (nationally)	Syrian	12%	68%	VASyR	2020
Labor force participation rate - Informal	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	55%	54%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Unemployment rate - (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	14.30%	10%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Unemployment rate - Beirut- Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	12.90%	10.80%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2020
Unemployment rate - ML- Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	12.80%	9.20%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2020
Unemployment rate - Akkar- Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	11.30%	8.70%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2020
Unemployment rate - Nabatieh- Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	15.20%	9.30%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2020
Unemployment rate - Bekaa	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	16.30%	12.70%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2020
Unemployment rate - Foreign migrant workers (excluding Syrians)		No representative data			
Unemployment rate - LGBTIQ+ persons		No representative data			
Percentage of monthly paid employees	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	78%	49%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage employment in Formal Sector	Lebanese	81.60%	65.50%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Percentage employment in Formal Sector	Lebanese and non-Lebanese	11%	51%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of employment share in Agriculture	Syrians	46%		VASyR	2020
SUB-SECTOR 3: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT					
Percentage of Lebanese firms with which women amongst their owners	Not confirmed	10%		World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of Lebanese firms that are majority female owned	Not confirmed	5%		World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of self-employed persons	Not confirmed	11%	25%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of working respondents reporting sexual harrassment at work	Lebanese and Syrian	17%		SSGA	2021
Percentage of working respondents reporting verbal harrassment at work	Lebanese and Syrian	25%		SSGA	2021
SUB-SECTOR 4: NORMS AND FAMILY LIFE					
Percentage of women who said they never thought of engaging in work	Lebanese and Syrian	31%		SSGA	2021
Of women surveyed who said they never thoughts of engaging in work, percentage of women whose spouses do not allow them to work	Lebanese and Syrian	22%		SSGA	2021
Of women surveyed who said they never thoughts of engaging in work, percentage of women who think they do not have the required skills to work	Lebanese and Syrian	23%		SSGA	2021
Of women surveyed who said they never thoughts of engaging in work, percentage of women who said that inability to work is due to childcare responsibilities	Lebanese and Syrian	26%		SSGA	2021
Percentage of women who reported 'participation in traditionally female domestic tasks,' with these tasks defined as: washing clothes, preparing food, cleaning the kitchen or sitting rooms, cleaning the bathroom or toilet	Lebanese and Syrian	98%	68%	IMAGES/UN WOMEN	2018

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Percentage of men and women believing that child care negatively affects children	Lebanese	63%		World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of women reporting challenges in finding childcare services	Syrian	71%		UN Women	Forthcoming b
Percentage of women struggling to maintain housework while working	Syrian	38%		UN Women	Forthcoming b
SUB-SECTOR 3: EDUCATION					
Percentage of persons who are illiterate (above age 15)	Lebanese	8.30%	4.20%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Percentage of persons who are illiterate (above age 15)	Non-Lebanese	86.10%	91.40%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Percentage of youth who are illiterate - (age15-24)	Lebanese	1.50%	1.90%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
Percentage of youth who are illiterate - (age15-24)	Non-Lebanese	26.70%	13.40%	Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)	2018-2019
SUB-SECTOR 8: SEXUAL HEALTH AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS					
Maternal mortality rate (death per 100,000 live births)	Non-Lebanese	23.70		UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
	Lebanese	6.10		UNDP and CAS 2021 Gender profile	Forthcoming
Percentage of adolescent girls not being able to afford menstrual Hygiene supplies on a monthly basis	Lebanese and Syrian	66%		Plan International	2020
	Syrian	55%		Plan International	2020
	Lebanese	45%		Plan International	2020
SECTOR III: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AND POLITICAL LIFE					
SUB-SECTOR 1: WOMEN IN ELECTED POSITIONS					
Women in government at ministerial level (as % of total)		30%	70%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Seats in National Assembly held by women (% of total)		5%	95%	World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of female candidates focused on women's rights		89%		World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of female municipal councilors		6%		UNDP	2016
Percentage of female mukhtars		2%		UNDP	2016
Percentage of female voters		49%	51%	UNDP	2016
Number of women registered as candidates in national elections (in 2018)		113 women		World Bank, UN Women, NCLW	Forthcoming
Percentage of female candidates in parliament who reported being victims of violence during the 2018 elections		79%		UN Women	2018
Percentage of voting spaces accessible for disabled people		1%		LUPD	2008
Percentage supporting a women's quota		81%		SSGA	2021
SUB-SECTOR 2: WOMEN IN UNIONS AND SYNDICATES					
Percentage of women who occupied leadership positions in the Beirut Bar Association's committees (in 2016)	Lebanese	17%	83%	Hivos	2021
Percentage of women board members in the Beirut Bar Association (in 2017)	Lebanese	8%	92%	Hivos	2021
Percentage of women board members in the Tripoli Bar Association (in 2017)	Lebanese	0%	100%	Hivos	2021
Percentage of women in the order of physicians (in 2018)	Lebanese	25%	75%	Hivos	2021
Percentage of female registered engineers (in 2018)	Lebanese	13%	87%	Hivos	2021
Percentage of women occupying leadership positions in the engineering syndicate committees	Lebanese	5%	95%	Hivos	2021

AREA	NATIONALITY	VALUE (FEMALE)	VALUE (MALE)	SOURCE	PUBLICATION YEAR
Female representation in the order of nurses	Lebanese	62%	38%	Hivos	Hivos
Percentage of syndicates who had quota for women in their bylaws	Lebanese	0%		Hivos	2021
SUB-SECTOR 3: WOMEN IN THE SECURITY SECTOR					
Percentage of women who serve in the total security personnel in Lebanon		No data available			
Percentage of women in ISF		3.60%		LAU	2020
Percentage of women in general security personnel		4.70%		LAU	2020
Percentage of women in the LAF		5%		LAU	2020
SUB-SECTOR 4: WOMEN IN REFORM, ACTIVISM AND PEACE EFFORTS					
Percentage of women who participated in Taef accord		0%		GIWPS	2019
Percentage of women who participated in national dialogues		0%		WAHLISCH	2017



Funded by the European Union

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of UN Women Lebanon and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



United Nations Entity for Gender Equality
and the Empowerment of Women